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Abstract
This Note examines the legal conflicts in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that developed
due to the Agency’s attempt to verify North Korea’s compliance with the NPT. Part I reviews the
history of the nonproliferation regime, as well as the pertinent textual provisions of the IAEA
Statute, the NPT, and the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. Part II reviews the events
leading up to North Korea’s alleged withdrawal from the NPT and discusses the DPRK’s and the
Agency’s legal arguments concerning North Korea’s rights under the regime. Part III argues that
the Agency has the right to inspect the DPRK’s facilities because: (i) every law in the regime must
be read in light of the other regime laws, and (ii) the regime as a whole mandates that an NPT signatory relinquish its sovereign rights as necessary to ensure global collective security. This Note
concludes that delegates attending the upcoming 1995 NPT renewal conference should develop
regime laws that: (i) regulate the Agency’s administration of intelligence received from third parties, and (ii) unify the regime’s emphasis on global rights to collective security over national rights
of sovereignty.

NOTES
BALANCING COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY: DOES THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE THE
RIGHT TO INSPECT NORTH KOREA'S
NUCLEAR FACILITIES?
Susan Carmody*
INTRODUCTION
The global community has sought a collective security' from
the threatening spread of nuclear weapons and the corresponding likelihood of nuclear war' since the Atomic Age3 began.4
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. See U.N. CARER art. I(1). As defined by the United Nations, collective security
is the maintenance of international peace and security by taking effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, by suppressing acts of
aggression, and by bringing about, in conformity with the principals of international
law, settlement of international disputes that might lead to a breach of the peace. Id.
The maintenance of collective security is the first listed purpose of the United Nations.
Id.
2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signatureJuly 1,
1968, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. 483, 484, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 169 [hereinafter NPT or Treaty].
The term "nuclear proliferation" refers to the spread of nuclear weapons, by purchase
or technological development, among nations. See id. (discussing dangers that nuclear
proliferation brings). The spread of nuclear weapons raises many fears among nations
that possess nuclear weapons as well as nations that lack them. Id. One fear is that the
likelihood of nuclear warfare increases as the number of nations possessing nuclear
weapons grows. Id. Another fear is that the risk of nuclear war increases as nations that
already possess nuclear weapons acquire more nuclear weapons. See id. 21 U.S.T. at
485, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (stating one purpose of Treaty is to cease nuclear arms race).
Finally, some nations fear that the increasing number of nuclear weapons development
programs increases the risk of a nuclear accident because some nations may not implement adequate nuclear safety controls in their drive to develop atomic weapons. See,
e.g., Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, art. III(A), 8
U.S.T. 1093, 1095-96, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (amended Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135, 471
U.N.T.S. 333) [hereinafter IAEA Statute] (stating that International Atomic Energy
Agency function is to provide safe standards of using nuclear materials for peaceful
purposes).
3. In this Note, the "Atomic Age" began when the United States dropped an
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON,
THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMEPUCAN PEOPLE, 1869-1963, at 407-08 (1972). The
bomb dropped on Hiroshima was the first nuclear weapon used in combat. Id. at 408.
A few days after the Hiroshima bombing, the United States also dropped the only other
nuclear weapon ever used in warfare on Nagasaki, Japan. Id.
4. See 1 DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1945-1959 7-16 [hereinafter DISARMAMENT]
(reviewing initial American nuclear nonproliferation proposal); U.S. ARMS CONTROL
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The United Nations has attempted to achieve such security by
making the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations a
violation of international law' through the development of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime.6 This regime is composed of customary international law' and three sources of treaty
law: the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency8
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NucLFA.R WEAPONS, 1 (1969) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS].

5. E.g., NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161; IAEA Statute,
supra note 2, 8 U.S.T. at 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. at 3. A rule of international law is one that
has been accepted as such by the international community of States in the form of
customary international law, by international agreement, or by derivation from general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN LAw § 102(1) (1986).
6. E.g., NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161; LAEA Statute,
supra note 2, 8 U.S.T. at 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. at 3; Agreement of3OJanuary 1992 between the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the InternationalAtomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof
Nuclear Weapons, Jan. 30 1992, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 (May 1992) [hereinafter
INFCIRC/403 or North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement]. For the purposes of
this Note, a regime is a system of laws. See generally Bill Monahan, Note, Giving the NonProliferationTreaty Teeth: Strengthening the Special Inspection Procedures of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, 33 VA. J. INT'L. L. 161 (1992) (describing laws of nuclear nonproliferation regime and how these laws apply to Agency's verification of facilities in
Iraq).
7. See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1984) [hereinafter
STAPxE]. Until recently, international law mostly consisted of customary rules. Id. Customary international law is the unified and self-consistent practice of nations that is not
codified in written law. Id. The practice of international organizations, whether by
conduct or declaration, may lead to the development of customary international law
concerning their powers or responsibilities. Id. at 110. Unanimous United Nations
General Assembly resolutions may become customary international law. Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, 178 REc. DES COURS 111-21 (1982-V), reprinted in
BARv E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 114-15 (1991).

According to the Restatement, customary international law results when States follow a general and consistent practice due to a sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN LAW § 102(2) (1986). International agreements create law for the
states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely
accepted. Id.
For example, as of December 31, 1993, there were 162 signatories to the NPT.
1993 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 12, U.N. Sales No. E.94.IX.1. Thus, the NPT is widely
accepted by the global community. Furthermore, NPT signatories intend that the
other signatories, which also compose the majority of states in the global community,
adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. See generally NPT, supra note 2, 21
U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161.
8. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, 8 U.S.T. at 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. at 3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the international organization that monitors use of nuclear materials to promote safety and peaceful nuclear technological developments. See
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("LAEA Statute"), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty9 ("NPT"
or "Treaty"), and individually-negotiated bilateral safeguards
agreements' ° between the International Atomic Energy Agency1 1
("Agency") and each NPT signatory state. 2
Generally, the regime created by these international laws requires a signatory without nuclear weapons ("non-nuclear signatory") to relinquish its sovereign'" right to develop or to acquire
nuclear weapons. 14 In addition, non-nuclear signatories must regenerally id. The International Atomic Energy Agency also works under the NPT to
prevent an illegal spread of nuclear weaponry by transfer or technological development. See generally NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161.
9. NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161.
10. Id. art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172; see The Structure and
Contents of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection With the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, 1 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 at 1 (June 1972,
reprinted Feb. 1983) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153] (describing provisions that bilateral
Agency-signatory safeguards agreement should contain); see, e.g., INFCIRC/403, supra
note 6, at 1 (bilateral safeguard agreement between Agency and DPRK). The NPT
requires each NPT signatory to begin negotiating an individualized safeguards agreement with the Agency within 180 days of the signatory's ratification of the Treaty. NPT,
supra note 2, art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
Safeguards are the tools that the Agency uses to verify that an NPT signatory is not
secretly violating the Treaty by covertly diverting nuclear materials towards the production of nuclear weapons. INFCIRC/153, supra, 1 2, at 1. Safeguards include: (i) the
Agency's ability to account for the amount of nuclear material coming in and out of the
signatory's territory by reviewing the signatory's reports to the Agency, id. 11 59-69, at
16-18; (ii) the Agency's ability to conduct announced and unannounced inspections of
the signatory's territory to confirm the signatory's reports, id. 1 70-89, at 18-24; and
(iii) the Agency's ability to place, leave, and retrieve containment and surveillance devices upon the signatory's nuclear materials and processing facilities, such as cameras
and container seals, that independently account for the signatory's nuclear materials
while the Agency inspectors are absent. Id. 1 74, at 19.
11. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. II, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 4. The
International Atomic Energy Agency was created by the IAEA Statute to accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout
the would. Id.
12. E.g., INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, pmbl.
13. PHILIP C.JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 41 (1968). Sovereignty is, in its
traditional connotation, the ultimate freedom of national will unrestricted by law. Id.
In its newer connotations, sovereignty is the exclusiveness of'jurisdiction in a defined
domain. Id. at 41. Every foreign policy assumes the integrity and inviolability of the
national territory. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 13-27 (2nd ed. 1979). Nonetheless, Henkin also acknowledges that internal sovereignty can be limited by treaty or
international law. Id.
14. NPT, supra note 2, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171-72. The
NPT only bans the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons among non-nuclearweapon signatories ("NNWS"). See NPT, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, 729
U.N.T.S. at 172-73 (stating that Treaty encourages peaceful uses of atomic power but
bans development of nuclear weapons). An NPT signatory receives Agency assistance
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frain from exercising certain sovereign rights that would impede
the Agency's ability to verify that the non-nuclear signatory is not
secretly attempting to develop nuclear weapons."5 In consideration of a signatory's concession of these sovereign rights, the re-

gime allows the non-nuclear signatory to make use of the
Agency's technical and financial expertise in the development of
17
non-proscribed1 6 nuclear programs.
Unfortunately, the regime's different laws, such as the NPT
and IAEA Statute, do not uniformly define what sovereign rights
a signatory relinquishes when it signs the regime's treaties. 8
This lack of uniformity between the regime's laws has enabled
one non-nuclear signatory, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea' 9 ("DPRK" or "North Korea"), to argue that the NPT allows the DPRK to deny the Agency's inspectors access to some
suspected North Korean nuclear-weapon sites.20 The DPRK
in the development of nuclear technology for purposes not proscribed by the NPT.
IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(A) (1), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6-8. For
example, the Agency could help a NNWS develop a nuclear power plant. See id. art.
III(A) (1)-(3) (describing Agency functions that help build signatory's ability to harness
nuclear power for peaceful purposes).
Furthermore, not all military uses of nuclear power are impermissible under the
NPT. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14(a). Article 14 of INFCIRC/403 is entitled
"Non-application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material to Be Used in Non-Peaceful Activities." I&L art. 14(a). Thus, for example, a NNWS could legally develop a nuclear-powered submarine. See id. (discussing permissible uses of nuclear materials in military
applications). Because the NPT bans a non-nuclear signatory's development of nuclear
weapons, however, such a signatory could not permissibly develop nuclear missiles to
place on that submarine. See NPT, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161
(prohibiting non-nuclear signatory development of nuclear weapons).
15. See, e.g., NPT, supra note 2, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (requiring that NNWS refrain from producing nuclear weapons); LAEA Statute, supra note 2,
art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1095-96, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6-8 (stating that some signatory sovereign rights are subject to terms of IAEA statute).
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing proscribed and non-proscribed uses of nuclear materials under nuclear nonproliferation regime).
17. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III, 8 U.S.T. at 1095-96, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6-8.
18. Compare, e.g., TAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1095-96, 276
U.N.T.S. at 6-8 (Agency's activities will be carried out with due observance to sovereign
rights of States) and id., supra note 2, art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26-30
(providing that Agency only has right to enter signatory's territory if signatory requests
safeguards) with INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 2 (stating that Agency shall have right
to apply safeguards anywhere in North Korean territory for purpose of verifying NPT
compliance).
19. This Note also refers to the DPRK by the name of its capital, Pyongyang.
20. See, e.g., Statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (Mar. 12, 1993) [hereinafter DPRKWithdrawal Statement], in Report by theDirector
General of The InternationalAtomic Energy Agency on Behalf of the Board of Governors to All
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raised this argument after learning that the Agency had received
third-party intelligence that claimed the DPRK was building nuclear weapons at a hidden and previously uninspected location.2 1
This Note examines the legal conflicts in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that developed due to the Agency's attempt
to verify North Korea's compliance with the NPT. Part I reviews
the history of the nonproliferation regime, as well as the pertinent textual provisions of the IAEA Statute, the NPT, and the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement.2 2 Part II reviews
the events leading up to North Korea's alleged withdrawal from
the NPT 2 3 and discusses the DPRK's and the Agency's legal arguments concerning North Korea's rights under the regime. Part
III argues that the Agency has the right to inspect the DPRK's
Members of the Agency on the Non-complianceof the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea with
the Agreement Between the IAEA and the DemocraticPeople's Republicof Koreafor the Application
of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(INFCIRC/403)and on the Agency's Inability to Ve7ify the Non-Diversion of MaterialRequired to
Be Safeguarded, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419, annex 7, at 4 (Apr. 8, 1993) [hereinafter
INFCIRC/419] (containing documents from DPRK that allege North Korea can withdraw to protect its "supreme interests"); accord NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at
493-94, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175 (providing that signatory can withdraw from NPT in furtherance of signatory's "supreme interests"); see also supra note 18 and accompanying
text (discussing incongruity between different legal sources of nonproliferation regime).
The DPRK has an unusual history with the other parties involved in this legal dispute, i.e, the United Nations, the United States, and the Republic of Korea. See generally
Lvou BYUNG-HwA, PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1986).
In 1950, the United Nations authorized the use of force against communist forces from
northern Korea that had invaded southern Korea. S.C. Res. 1588, U.N. SCOR, 5th
Sess., 476 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1588]. After three years
of fighting, the United Nations concluded an armistice agreement that divided Korea
into two distinct territories. See generally The Korean Question, G.A. Res 711, U.N. GAOR,
7th Sess., Supp. No. 20B at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/711 (1953) (approving Korean Armistice Agreement). However, the United Nations did not formally recognize the DPRK
as an independent and sovereign state until 1991. Admission of The DemocraticPeople's
Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to Membership in the United Nations, GA Res. 1,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/L.1 and Add.1) (1991).
21. See INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 2-3; see also DPRK Withdrawal Statement,
supra note 20, at 2.
22. See supra notes 1-2, 6 and accompanying text (introducing IAEA Statute, NPT,
and North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing NPT's allowance for
States to withdraw in light of their supreme interests and North Korea's attempt to
make such withdrawal). The Agency alleges that North Korea's withdrawal statement is
ineffective and considers the DPRK to be a NPT signatory. Telephone Interview with
Marlene O'Dell, Press Officer, International Atomic Energy Agency, Sep. 15, 1994.
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facilities because: (i) every law in the regime must be read in
light of the other regime laws, and (ii) the regime as a whole
mandates that an NPT signatory relinquish its sovereign rights as
necessary to ensure global collective security. This Note concludes that delegates attending the upcoming 1995 NPT renewal
conference 24 should develop regime laws that: (i) regulate the
Agency's administration of intelligence received from third parties, and (ii) unify the regime's emphasis on global rights to collective security over national rights of sovereignty.
I. HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
Although the desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world is as old as the Atomic Age,25
the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
195726 was the first step toward the establishment of a global
nonproliferation regime. Created by the IAEA Statute, 27 the
Agency offers technical and financial assistance in the development of nuclear capabilities for non-proscribed purposes 28 to
Member States. To ensure that the Agency's assistance would
not be used to develop nuclear weapons, the IAEA Statute also
gave the Agency a limited ability to monitor the member's use of
the Agency's assistance. 29 Even after the Agency's creation, however, the world community still lacked an agreement that defined nuclear proliferation and pledged to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.3 0
As the rate of nuclear weapons proliferation increased
among nations during the 1960s, the corresponding need for an
international nuclear nonproliferation law compelled most nations to consent to a global agreement. 3 ' The result was the Nu24. NPT, supra note 2, art. X(2), 21 U.S.T. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. The NPT is
scheduled to be renewed in 1995. Id.
25. See supra note 3 (defining Atomic Age).
26. LAEA Statute, supra note 2, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 14 (discussing non-proscribed purposes of nuclear materials).
29. See IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII(A) (6), 8 U.S.T. at 1106, 276 U.N.T.S. at
28 (allowing Agency to send inspectors into Member State's territory after consultation
with Member State).
30. INTERNATioNAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at ix.
31. See id. (reviewing global efforts to reach nonproliferation agreement after
French and Chinese nuclear explosions).
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clear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.32 The NPT seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear warfare by prohibiting the spread of
nuclear weapons to signatories that do not possess them. 3 The
NPT also uses the Agency as the organization responsible for verifying that a signatory is not secretly producing or acquiring nuclear weapons. 31 Yet the NPT does not contain a provision defining the specific rights that the Agency has, and thus the specific
rights that the signatory relinquishes, when the Agency carries
out its verification duties.3 5 Instead, the NPT only requires that
a signatory begin negotiating its own safeguards 6 agreement
with the Agency.-" North Korea concluded its safeguards agreement with the Agency seven years after it ratified the NPT.
A. The Creation of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency
The United States wanted to establish a combined global
nonproliferation regime and international monitoring agency as
soon as the Atomic Age dawned. 9 The first U.S. proposal, combining both a nuclear nonproliferation regime and a monitoring
agency, was unsuccessful.4" As its initial plan lost momentum,
the United States suggested that the United Nations create an
32. NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
33. Id. arts. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. The NPT also requires
nuclear weapon signatories to pursue good faith negotiations relating to the end of the
arms race. Id. art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
34. Id. art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 10 (discussing definition of safeguards).
37. NPT, supra note 2, art. 111(4), 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The NPT
also requires that the signatory's bilateral safeguard agreement with the Agency be concluded within one hundred and eighty days of the signatory's NPT ratification. I.
38. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 2.
39. See 1 DISARMAMENT, supra note 4, at 7-16 (reviewing first U.S. nuclear nonproliferation proposal); see also INTRNAIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at 1-2 (sum-

marizing history of initial U.S. disarmament plans).
40. See 1 DISA.AMENT, supra note 4, at 7-16 (reviewing early U.S. nuclear nonproliferation proposal); see also INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at 1-2 (sum-

marizing first U.S. nuclear nonproliferation proposals). This early U.S. proposal is
commonly referred to as the Baruch Plan. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4,
at 2. Id. The monitoring agency proposed under the Baruch Plan could impose sanctions directly upon signatories that committed minor transgressions regarding nuclear
nonproliferation as well as refer States that committed major violations to the U.N.
Security Council for reprisal. Id. The majority of United Nations Member States endorsed the Baruch Plan, but failed to nurture it beyond the draft treaty stage due to
superpower bickering in the face of the intensifying arms race. Id. Nine years later, the
United States dropped the plan. Id.
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4
agency to monitor the peaceful uses of atomic energy. " This
proposal led to the 1957 birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("Agency") ,42 the only organization ever created
under the aegis, 4 3 but not as a "specialized agency,"" of the
United Nations.
The Agency serves two purposes.4 5 First, the Agency is to
accelerate and enlarge peaceful uses of atomic energy. 46 Second, the Agency must ensure, as far as it is able under the IAEA
Statute, that any assistance it provides, supervises, or controls is
not used to further any military purpose.4 7 However, the IAEA
Statute does not contain provisions to stop the proliferation of
nuclear weapons if those weapons are being built without
Agency assistance.48
Operating under the terms of the IAEA Statute, the Agency
strikes a balance between its duty to effectuate the global drive
for collective security with -the signatory's desire to retain national sovereignty. 49 On one hand, Article XII of the IAEA Statute grants the Agency certain rights and responsibilities anytime
the Agency applies safeguards.5 ° One such right is the Agency's
ability to send inspectors into a signatory's territory.5 1 Under the
41. See generally INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at 2. The Agency can
assist Member States with peaceful uses of atomic power, such as power plants, by providing members with the material, equipment, and technical advice necessary to develop such uses. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6.
42. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
43. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 7, at 463. In carrying out its functions, the

Agency must act within the United Nations' purposes of international cooperation, policies of safeguarded world-wide disarmament, and in conformity with any subsequent
international agreements. LAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(B) (1), 8 U.S.T. at 1096,
276 U.N.T.S. at 8.
44. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 7, at 462. Because the Agency is not a special-

ized agency of the United Nations, it reports directly to the U.N. General Assembly and,
when appropriate, to the U.N. Security Council. Id. at 463.
'45. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. II, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 4.
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. See id. art. III, 8 U.S.T. at 1095-96, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6 (lacking prohibition on
building nuclear weapons without direct or indirect Agency assistance).
49. Compare id. art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26 (giving Agency
right to apply safeguards only when requested by parties concerned) with id., art.

III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8 (stating that, subject to IAEA Statute provisions, Agency functions shall be carried out with due observance of sovereign rights of
States).
50. Id. art. XII(A), 8 U.S.T. at 11-15, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26-30.
51. Id. art. XII(A) (6). The provision's text states that the Agency has the right
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terms of IAEA Statute, Agency inspectors have access at all times
to all places, data, and persons who deal with nuclear materials,
equipment, or facilities in their occupations.5 2 On the other
hand, Agency inspectors only have access to these persons, data,
and places if that access is necessary to ensure that the nuclear
materials supplied by the Agency are being used for peaceful
purposes only.53 In addition, the Agency only has the right to
such access after consulting with the signatory.-4 Thus, a signatory to the IAEA Statute may deny Agency inspectors access by
refusing to consult with the Agency regarding access and safeguard issues.55 A signatory can also probably curtail the effectiveness of safeguards by limiting the scope of inspections during
the consultation session.5 6 Most importantly, the IAEA Statute
also guarantees its signatories that, subject to the IAEA Statute's
provisions, the activities of the Agency shall be carried out in due
observance of the sovereign rights of states.5 7 Only an additional
Agency-signatory agreement can augment the Agency's power to
enter the signatory's territory.5 "
[t]o send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors ....
after consultation with the State... who shall have access at all times to all
places and data and to any person who by reason of their occupation deals
with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be
safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied.., and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose ....
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. XII(A).
55. See id. (giving signatory right to deny Agency inspectors access by giving signatory right to refuse safeguards).
56. See id. Article XII(A) (6) does not specify whether the Agency-signatory consultation allows the consulting parties to define where inspections will occur. Id. However, as the inspections can only occur with places, data, and people that deal with
nuclear materials in their occupation, iU., the signatory state can probably limit the
scope of inspections by arguing that the Agency inspections exceed the statutory scope.
See id.
57. Id. art. 111(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8. The text of Article III(D),
states that:
Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements
concluded between a State or group of States and the Agency which shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, the activities of this Agency shall
be carried out with due observance of the sovereign rights of States.
Id.
58. Id. (requiring that, subject to terms of agreement with signatory or terms of
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The IAEA Statute also gives the Agency certain duties.5 9
First, the Agency is obligated to treat all its members as equally
sovereign nations.6" Second, the Agency must perform certain
duties if the Agency is confronted with a member's refusal to
implement safeguards. 6 ' When a Member State refuses to implement mandated safeguards, the IAEA Statute requires the
Agency's inspectors to report any non-compliance to the
Agency's Director-General.6 2 The Director-General then sub63
mits the inspectors' report to the Agency's Board of Governors
("Board"). The Board must then report the non-compliance to
all Agency members, the United Nations Security Council ("U.N.
Security Council") and the United Nations General Assembly
IAEA Statute, Agency shall function with due observance of Member State's sovereign
rights).
59. E.g., id art. IV(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 10; id. art. XII(C), 8
U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28.
60. Id. art. IV(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 108.
61. Id. art. XII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28. The pertinent part of
Article XII, paragraph C states that:
The [Agency] inspectors shall report any noncompliance to the Direct
General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.
The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any
non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the
non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and the General
Assembly of the United Nations. In event of failure of the recipient State or
States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable amount of time, the
Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or
suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member, and
call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient
member or group of members. The Agency may also ... suspend any noncomplying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.
Id.
62. Id. The Director-General is the chief administrative officer of the Agency. Id.
art. VII(A), 8 U.S.T. at 1101, 276 U.N.T.S. at 15. The Director-General is responsible
for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the staff. Id. art. VII(B), 8 U.S.T.
at 1101, 276 U.N.T.S. at 15.
63. Id. art. XII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 30. The Board also has the
responsibility of preparing and submitting reports to the United Nations. Id. art. VI(J),
8 U.S.T. at 1101, 276 U.N.T.S. at 17. Each Governor on the Board has one vote. Id. art.
VI, 8 U.S.T. at 1100, 276 U.N.T.S. at 17. Votes of the Board constitute Agency resolutions. See, e.g., Report on the Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency and the
DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Prolferationof Nuclear Weapons, Bd. of Governors Res. 2636, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2636 (Feb. 25, 1993) [hereinafter GOV/2636], in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20,
annex 3 (calling upon DPRK to discharge North Korean responsibilities under
INFCIRC/403, requiring Director-General to report such resolution to DPRK, and deciding to remain seized of such matter).
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("U.N. General Assembly") 64
B. The Creation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Although the IAEA Statute contained provisions to verify
that the nuclear materials provided by the Agency were being
used only for peaceful purposes,65 there was no international law
that prohibited the spread of nuclear weapons among nations if
that spread occurred without Agency assistance.66 The international proposals and draft treaties offered between 1956 and
1966 were quashed by the conflicting military interests of the
Cold War 67 superpowers.6 Yet, throughout the 1960s, nuclear

weapons spread among nations at a steadily increasing rate.

9

By

1968, world fear of nuclear proliferation was great enough to

create a global agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. 70
1. Global Drives for a Nonproliferation Treaty, 1956-1967
As nuclear weapons proliferated at a steadily increasing rate
during the 1960s, the world community felt increasingly
64. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 30. If
the non-compliance continues for an unreasonable time, the Agency may also call for
the return of materials and equipment as well as suspend the Member State's privileges.
Id art. XII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 30.
65. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art III(A) (2), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6; see
supra note 14 (describing proscribed and non-proscribed uses of nuclear materials
under nonproliferation regime).
66. INTERNATIONAL

NEGOTIATIONS, supra

note 4, at ix-x.

67. Frank Whelon Wayman, Protecting American Security Interests: An Arms Control
Agenda, in

THROUGH THE STRAIGHTS OF ARMAGEDDON: ARMS CONTROL

IssuEs AND PROS-

234-35 (Paul F. Diehl & Loch K. Johnson eds., 1991). This Note uses the term
"Cold War" to refer to the political and military tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union that arose between 1945 to 1988. See id.
PEGTs

68. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at ix. In 1956, the Eisenhower

administration tried an approach that was more limited than the Baruch Plan. Id.; see
supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Baruch Plan). Eisenhower's proposal
called for a production cessation of nuclear materials for military purposes. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at ix. In 1957, four members of the five-nation
Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission ("UNDC") merged
this "cutoff" proposal into the first multilateral nuclear nonproliferation measure and
submitted it to the UNDC. Id. The fifth nation on the subcommittee, the Soviet
Union, rejected the proposal. Id.
69. See id. at ix-x (relating how nuclear bombs were detonated by France in 1960
and China in 1964).
70. See, e.g., id. at 12 (summarizing how world distress at rate of nuclear proliferation urged states to conclude nuclear nonproliferation agreement).
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threatened by the prospect of nuclear war. 7 ' In 1961, the U.N.

General Assembly "unanimously"72 adopted a resolution 71 calling upon all states to conclude a nuclear nonproliferation agreement. 74 In 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States entertained private bilateral talks on the nuclear nonproliferation issue. 75 In 1964, in Cairo, nonaligned 76 nations issued a
declaration that urged all states to agree upon a nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament treaty.7 7 Six days after the Cairo
declaration, however, the People's Republic of China exploded a
nuclear bomb.78
The Chinese explosion increased world-wide fears of nu71. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at ix. In 1960, France became the
fourth nuclear-weapon state. Id. Furthermore, the world community strongly and correctly suspected that the People's Republic of China's nuclear program was only a few
years behind France's. Id.
72. Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res 1665, U.N.
GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) [hereinafter GA. Res.
1665]. There was one vote against the resolution, but the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency considers the vote to be unanimous. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS,
supra note 4, at 5.
73. G.A. Res. 1665, supra note 72.
74. G.A. Res. 1665, art. 1, at 6. The U.N. General Assembly "[b]elieved in the necessity of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control," id. pmbl., at 6,
and called upon all nations
to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international
agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would refrain
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would
undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.
Id. art. 1, at 6. That same day, Sweden's Foreign Minister Osten Uld~n suggested that
the non-nuclear nations take the initiative from the nuclear club. INTERNATIONAL NE-

supra note 4, at ix. Hours later, the General Assembly also passed a Swedish-sponsored resolution, Question of Disarmament, GA. Res 1664, U.N. GAOR, 16th
Sess., Supp. No. 17 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1965), asking the Secretary-General to
inquire into conditions under which the non-nuclear states would agree not to acquire
GOTIATIONS,

or produce nuclear weapons. 1i; INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at ix.
75. INTERNATIONAL NEoom-TIONS, supra note 4, at ix.

76. Ted Greenwood, DiscouragingProiferationin the Next Decade and Beyond, in NuCLEAR PROLIFERATION: MOTIVATIONS, CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL

112-113

(Council of Foreign Relations ed., 1977). In this Note, the term "nonaligned" nations
refers to nations that did not politically align themselves with either the Soviet Union or
the United States. See id. (discussing impact of non-nuclear state decision whether to
align with nuclear superpower upon same non-nuclear state's decision whether to acquire nuclear weapons or not).
77. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at x.
78. Id. at xi.
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clear war and global desire for a nuclear nonproliferation pact.
The United States and the Soviet Union tried to respond to
these fears and desires in 1965 by submitting draft nonproliferation treaties in the United Nations.80 The 1965 negotiations be-

79. Id
80. See id. at x-xi (outlining superpowers desire to respond to international pressure demanding that nonproliferation agreement be reached). In 1965, the United
States submitted a nonproliferation draft treaty. U.S. Proposal Submitted to ENDC:
Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Aug. 17, 1965, U.N. Doc.
ENDC/152, in U.N. Doc. A/5986 (1965), 4 I.L.M. 1149 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 U.S.
DraftTreaty]. The 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty did not require safeguards but did urge states
to apply either Agency's or an equivalent safeguards system. I& art. III, U.N. Doc.
ENDC/152 at 2, 4 I.L.M. at 1149. The 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty defined proliferation as
the numerical increase of states with independent power to fire nuclear weapons. I&
art. I, U.N. Doc. ENDC/152 at 1, 4 I.L.M. at 1149. The 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty also
allowed for a signatory's withdrawal with three months' notice to all signatory and acceding states, as well as the U.N. Security Council, if such notice included a statement
of the extraordinary events related to the subject matter that the state regarded as havingjeopardized its supreme interest. Id. art. VI, U.N. Doc. ENDC/152 at 3, 4 I.L.M. at
1149.
Again, superpower disagreements over the definition of proliferation as it per-

tained to military alliances killed the proposal. INTERNATIoNAL

NEGOTIATIONS,

supra

note 4, at x-xi. The Soviet Union opposed the 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty because of the
treaty's definition of proliferation. Id at x. The Soviets thought that the 1965 U.S.
Draft Treaty's definition of proliferation allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") to establish a multilateral nuclear force that would, in turn, give the
Federal Republic of Germany ("FRG") indirect access to nuclear weaponry. Id. The
United States replied that under the 1965 Draft Treaties definition, the FRG could not
fire U.S. missiles without U.S. consent. Id. While publicly applauding other nonproliferation goals achieved by the 1965 U.S. Draft Treay, the Soviet Union refused to
agree to any provision allowing such "indirect access." Id
One month later, the Soviet Union submitted its own draft treaty. Soviet Draft
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 24, 1965, U.N. GAOR, 1st
Comm., 20th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 160 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/5976, 4 I.L.M. 1141
[hereinafter Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty]. The 1965 Soviet Draft Treaty differed from the
U.S. proposal in several important areas. Compare, e.g., id. art 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/5976
at 2, 4 I.L.M. at 1142, with 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty, supra, art. III, U.N. Doc. ENDC/152
at 2, 4 I.L.M. at 1149 (providing for safeguards in 1965 U.S. Draft Treaty but not in
Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty). First, the Soviet version prohibited non-nuclear-weapon
states from the direct or indirect right to participate in the ownership, control or use of
nuclear weapons. Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty, supra, art. II(1), U.N. Doc. A/5976 at 2, 4
I.L.M. at 1142. Second, the 1965 Soviet Draft Treaty had no provision for safeguards.
It~rrmNArIONAL NEGOTIATONS, supra note 4, at xi. See generally Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty,
supra, U.N. Doc. A/5976, 4 I.L.M. at 1141. Also unlike its elder American cousin, the
Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty emphasized that each treaty party had the right, in exercising
its national sovereignty, to withdraw from the treaty with three months notice to other
signatories. Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty, supra, art. VI, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/5976 at 3, 4 I.L.M.
at 1143. Finally, the Soviet 1965 Draft Treaty allowed signatories to withdraw without
explanation of the extraordinary events that jeopardized the state's supreme interest.
I&
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tween the United States and Soviet Union failed because the two
countries could not agree upon a definition of proliferation, a
safeguards provision, and how much weight national sovereignty
should be given in the Treaty's withdrawal clause."' The
nonaligned nations' demand for complete disarmament also
helped to destroy the 1965 negotiations.8 2 Nonetheless, the
global community called for the continuation of nuclear nonproliferation treaty negotiations.8 3 The superpowers also helped
to break the cycle of disagreement by holding private discussions
during the United Nation's 21st General Assembly. 4 After intensive consultations with allies and interested parties, 8 5 in 1967
the United States and the Soviet Union submitted the result of
their private discussions to the U.N. General Assembly in the
form of identical draft treaties.8 6

81. See supra note 80 (discussing history of 1965 negotiations).
82. Disarmament Commission "Omnibus" Resolution, U.N. GA, 1st Comm. Res.,
102nd mtg., U.N. Doc. 225 (1965) [hereinafter Omnibus Resolution]. During the debate
surrounding theJune 15, 1965 Omnibus Resolution, Sweden, India and other countries
stated that a nonproliferation agreement should have disarmament measures linked to
it. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at x. Both the Soviet Union and the

United States expressed their desire to keep the nonproliferation issue separate. Id.
Nonetheless, all eight non-aligned Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission States
submitted a joint memorandum declaring that nonproliferation was not an end in itself. See generally Omnibus Resolution, supra, at 1-2 (noting with regret that no measures
for disarmament were developed during the nonproliferation negotiations of 1964).
83. Non-proiferation of Nuclear Weapons, GA Res. 2028, U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm.,
20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 at 7, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), 5 I.L.M. 169 (1965) [hereinafter G.A. Res 2028]. In November 1965, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution calling upon ENDC to negotiate a nonproliferation agreement. Id.
The resolution was sponsored by the eight nonaligned ENDC nations: Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates. INTERNATIoNAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at 138, FN. 15. The resolution passed by a 93-0

vote, with 5 abstentions by Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan, and Romania. Id.
84. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xiii. As a first step, the United

States and Soviet Union co-sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution asking all
nations to refrain from taking any actions that might damage the nonproliferation
treaty's development. Renunciation by States of Actions Hampering the Conclusion of an
Agreement on the NonprolferationofNucear Weapons, November 4th, 1966, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 110 members voted for the measure, Cuba abstained, and Albania voted against it. INTENATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS,

supra note 4, at 141.
85. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xiii-xiv.

86. Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 24, 1967,
U.N. Doc. DC/192 (1967), 7 I.L.M. 155 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 U.S.-Soviet Draft
Treaty].
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2. The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
After the world community commented upon the 1967
draft treaties, the United States and Soviet Union made the final
changes to what then became the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.8 7 Most importantly, the NPT prohibits: (i) the distribution of nuclear weapons by signatories that already possess
them to signatories that lack them,8" and (ii) the acquisition of
nuclear weapons among signatories that had not yet created
them.8 9 To induce non-nuclear nations to sign the Treaty, the
NPT contains indirect security pledges from nuclear to non-nuclear signatories.9 0 The NPT also allows a signatory to withdraw
when withdrawal would be in the signatory's supreme interests. 9 1
Finally, although the NPT uses the Agency as a monitoring organization to verify Treaty compliance, the NPT itself does not
contain a provision stating what measures the Agency may take
to monitor the signatory.92 Rather, the NPT mandates that each
signatory conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency
within eighteen months of the signatory's Treaty ratification.9 3
The NPT drafters envisioned that these provisions, taken together, would halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 94
87. See INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at 117-26 (reviewing history of
1967 U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty); NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
The withdrawal clause remained unchanged from the 1967 U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty.
NPT, supra note 2, art. X(1), 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. Article X(1) of the
NPT states that:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the
Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
88. Id. art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 161.
89. Id. The NPT also requires nuclear weapon signatories to negotiate an agreement to cease the nuclear arms race. Id. art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
90. E.g., id. pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 484-86, 729 U.N.T.S. at 162-63; id. art. VII, 21
U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173; Question Relating to Measures to Safeguard Non-NuclearWeapons States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, U.N. SCOR,
23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. No. s/255 (1968), 7 I.L.M. 895 (1968) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 255].
91. Id. art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
92. Id. art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 487-89, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
93. Id.
94. Id. pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 484-86, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169-71. The final version of the
NPT also reflects the nonaligned nations' demand for a global disarmament campaign.
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The NPT defines nuclear proliferation.9 5 Under the NPT,
nuclear-weapon signatories agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons to any recipient. 96 Nuclearweapon NPT signatories also agree not to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
or exercise control over such weapons or explosive devices.9 7
Similarly, non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to receive the
transfer or control of such devices."
The NPT's references that allow non-nuclear signatories to
be more secure from nuclear attacks are indirect.9 9 The NPT's
Preamble explicitly refers to the collective security pledge of the
U.N. Charter.1 0 Article VII of the NPT guarantees that nothing
Id. art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. The Treaty's Article VI, entitled "Disarmament Negotiations," never appeared in prior treaty drafts. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xv-xvi. Nonetheless, Article VI requires all parties to the Treaty
to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race ... and to nuclear.., general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control." NPT, supra note 2, art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490,
729 U.N.T.S. at 173. Several nations wanted the NPT to contain specific disarmament
measures, but both superpowers stated that such provisions could lead to a failure of
negotiations. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xv.

95. NPT, supra note 2, arts. I-I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
96. Id. art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. The text of Article I states that:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly,
and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. Article II states that:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Id.
99. Id. pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 484-86,729 U.N.T.S. at 171; id. art. VII, 21 U.S.T. at 491,
729 U.N.T.S. at 173; see S.C. Res. 255, supra note 90 (granting security assurances to
non-nuclear weapon signatories).
100. See NPT, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 486, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. Specifically, the pertinent parts of the Preamble state that the signatories:
Desir[e] to further the easing of international tension and the strengthen-
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in the Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude
regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear
weapons in their respective territories.'' Because many non-nuclear nations demanded a more explicit security pledge from nuclear nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union jointly sponsored a linked'0 2 resolution'03 in the
U.N. Security Council. 0 4
The NPT's withdrawal clause' 05 merged U,S. and Soviet
views"10 by allowing each signatory, in exercising its national sovereignty, to withdraw from the Treaty if that party decided that
ing of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons ....
Recall[ ] that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,
and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's
human and economic resources.
Id.
101. Id. art. VII, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
102. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xv. The linked security resolution was annexed with the final NPT draft as part of the 1968 ENDC report to the
General Assembly. Id.
103. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 90, 7 I.L.M. at 895. The pertinent part of the resolution says that:
The Security Council ....
1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such
aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in
which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent
members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations
under the United Nations Charter; ....
Id.
104. Id.; see INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 4, at xv-xvi (describing vote
count). The resolution passed 10-0 with 5 abstentions. Id. at xvi; see supra note 103
(stating S.C. Res. 255's text).
105. NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. The text of
the withdrawal clause states that:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the
Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interest.
Id.
106. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing differing Soviet and
American views on possible withdrawal provision).
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events related to the NPT jeopardized the signatory's supreme
interests.10 7 In such circumstances, a signatory may withdraw by
giving three months notice to the other NPT signatories and the
U.N. Security Council.' 0° Such notice of withdrawal must also
describe the extraordinary events that created the signatory's intent to withdraw.' 0 9 The withdrawal clause's language seems to
reflect the U.S. desire to temper unforeseen national developments and sudden withdrawals with the U.N. system of international regulation and collective security. 1 0
Finally, the NPT contains a provision that requires only nonnuclear-weapon states to accept Agency safeguards."' However,
the Treaty does not define the safeguards to which the new signatory must agree. 1 2 Rather, the NPT only requires that each
new signatory individually negotiate a safeguards agreement with

the Agency"' within eighteen months of ratifying the NPT."14

107. NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175; see supra note
105 (reviewing text of Article X).
108. NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 80-81 (discussing language contained in Article VI of U.S.
1965 Draft Treaty).
111. NPT, supra note 2, art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
112. INFCIRC/153, supra note 10, 1 74, at 19. Safeguards could include measures
such as placing cameras in the signatory's nuclear sites and seals on its nuclear material
containers. Id.
113. NPT, supra note 2, art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. Article
III states:
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed
with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by
this article.
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C. The DPRK's Ratification of the NPT and the North KoreanAgency Safeguards Agreement
In 1985, the DPRK ratified the NPT.115 The DPRK's individually-negotiated safeguards agreement with the Agency entered
into force on April 10, 1992.116 The North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement is explicitly promulgated under the NPT's
safeguards provision.'1 7 Moreover, the North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement fills in the blanks intentionally left by the
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering
the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities... in accordance with the
provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the
Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements
of this article.., in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Negotiation of such Agreements shall commence within 180
days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months
after the date of the initiation of negotiations.
lId.
114. Id. art. 111(4), 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. To assist each new nonnuclear signatory State in its safeguard agreement negotiation, in 1972 the Agency published a model safeguard agreement known as INFCIRC/153. INFCIRC/153, supra
note 13. Each new non-nuclear NPT signatory and the Agency use INFCIRC/153 as a
starting point in their bilateral safeguard agreement negotiations. See id. 1 28, at 8
(IAEA document to be used as "a basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between
the Agency and non-nuclear States"). Whatever final revisions and/or deletions to
INFCIRC/153 that the new non-nuclear signatory and Agency ultimately agree upon
then constitute their individualized safeguard agreement. Id.
115. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 2.
116. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, pmbl.
117. Id. art. 1. The North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement is explicitly
promulgated to fulfill the requirements of the NIT and its safeguards provision. Article 1 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement, entitled "Basic Undertaking,"
states that:
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards.., on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
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1 9 the Agency will use and
NPT" 8 regarding what safeguards
20
how the Agency will apply them.1
Under the terms of its safeguards agreement with the
Agency, the DPRK accepted safeguards on nuclear materials
used in all peaceful activities that are undertaken anywhere in its
territory.' 2' By signing the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement, the DPRK also acknowledged that the objective of
safeguards is to allow the Agency to verify that the DPRK is not
diverting significant amounts of nuclear materials from peaceful
nuclear activities to proscribed uses. 12 2 To protect against the
Agency being unnecessarily obtrusive in the DPRK's national affairs when verifying compliance, however, the North KoreanAgency Safeguards Agreement prioritizes different safeguards
measures.' 2 3 According to the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement, material accountancy is the Agency's safeguards
measure of fundamental importance, and containment and surveillance are complementary measures. 124 Finally, under the
terms of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement, the
DPRK and the Agency acknowledge that any amendments to the
must be agreed upon by both the Agency
safeguards agreement
25
DPRK'1
and the

1. Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement: Establishing Conditions for the Use of
Nuclear Materials in Military Applications
Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement contains a provision concerning the application of safe118. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing lack of specific safeguards mentioned in NPT).
119. See supra note 10 (defining safeguards); supra note 112 (discussing newer
forms of safeguards).
120. E.g., INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14 (describing safeguards to be applied
when nuclear materials are used in non-proscribed military applications); id. arts. 18-19
(describing Agency's reporting duties when Agency is unable to verify DPRK compliance).
121. Id. art. 1.
122. Id. art. 28; see supra note 14 (describing proscribed and non-proscribed uses
of nuclear materials). The Agency is also obliged to detect any such prohibited diversions in a timely manner. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 28.
123. Id. art. 29.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. 24(b).
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guards 126 when North Korea uses nuclear materials in military
applications. 127 Article 14 allows the suspension of Agency safeguards when nuclear materials are used in military applications.' 28 To suspend safeguards on nuclear materials being used
in military applications, Article 14 explicitly requires Pyongyang
to inform the Agency clearly that: (i) the nuclear materials' use
will not conflict with another activity for which Agency safeguards apply; 129 and (ii) that the materials will not be used for
the production of nuclear weapons.13 0 Under Article 14, the
DPRK has an express duty to make arrangements with the
Agency that identify the period or circumstances in which safeguards shall be suspended, as well as a duty to keep the Agency
informed of the quantity and composition of the unsafeguarded
materials.'13 Pyongyang must also allow the Agency to re-apply
safeguards as soon as the material is re-introduced into a peaceful nuclear activity.' 3 2 In any event, at all times, the DPRK must
keep the Agency informed of the total quantity and composition
of such unsafeguarded materials.' 3 Such information, however,
or classified
does not need to involve any Agency approval
34
knowledge of the military activity therein.1
2. The North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement's
Provisions for North Korean Non-Compliance with
Agency Safeguards
The North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement has two
articles that grant the Agency powers to enforce the Treaty when
the Agency determines that it cannot verify North Korea's compliance with the NPT.' 3 5 First, Article 19 of the North KoreanAgency Safeguards Agreement 3 6 provides that the Agency can
126. See supra note 10 (defining safeguards); supra note 112 (discussing alternative
forms of safeguards).
127. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14; see sufira note 14 (discussing which uses
of nuclear materials are proscribed by nuclear nonproliferation regime).
128. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14(a). The article is entitled "The Non-application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material to Be Used in Non-peaceful Activities." Id.
129. Id. art. 14(a)(i).
130. Id. art. 14(a) (ii).
131. Id. art. 14(b)-(c).
132. Id. art. 14(b).
133. Id. art. 14(b)-(c).
134. Id. art. 14 (b)-(c).
135. Id. art. 18-19.
136. Id. art. 19.
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take the measures outlined in Article XII of the IAEA Statute

when the Agency feels that it cannot verify the DPRK's compliance. 3 7 Thus, if the Agency's Board determines that the information reported by the Agency's Director-General is insufficient
to ensure verification, the Board can take the measures outlined
reporting the
in the Article XII of the IAFA Statute, including
13
non-compliance to the U.N. Security Council. 1
Second, Article 18 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement provides that the Board may "call upon"1 9 the DPRK
to take an action required by the Agency if the Board deems that
137. Id.; see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's duty to
report signatory non-compliance verify under Article XII(C) of LAEA Statute).
Article 19 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement states:
If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by
the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has
been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this
Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may
make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of
the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Statute") and may also take, where
applicable, other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such
action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the
safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board
with any necessary reassurance.
INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 19
138. Id.; see IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII(C) (describing mandatory Agency
duty to call upon member to remedy non-compliance with safeguards and then, if
member refuses, to report member's continuing non-compliance to U.N. Security
Council and U.N. General Assembly). Although the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement allows for the Agency to exercise some discretion when deciding whether to
report North Korea's non-compliance to the United Nations, see INFCIRC/403, supra
note 6, art. 19 (Agency "may" report inability to verify to United Nations), under the
IAEA Statute, this duty is mandatory. See IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII(C)
(Agency "shall" report non-compliance to United Nations). Thus, when the Agency's
inability to verify is due to a signatory's non-compliance, the Agency must report the
member's non-compliance to the United Nations. Compare IAEA Statute, supra note 2,
art. XII(C) (Agency "shall" report non-compliance to United Nations) with INFCIRC/
403, supra note 6, art. 19 (Agency "may" report inability to verify to United Nations).
The North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement also provides dispute resolution
mechanisms for less urgent disagreements. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, arts. 20-22.
Article 21 guarantees the DPRK the right to request that any question arising out of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement's interpretation or application be put to
the Board. Id. art. 21. Article 22 provides that, except when the Agency reports to the
U.N. Security Council that it is unable to verify the DPRK's NPT compliance, a threemember panel of arbitrators may be appointed at the request of either the DPRK or the
Agency to make a binding decision regarding the dispute. Id. art. 22.
139. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 18.
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the action is "essential and urgent" 140 in order to ensure verification. 14 1 The DPRK cannot delay taking any action, even by calling for arbitration, if the Agency's Board has deemed that the
action is "essential and urgent."

42

Thus, once the Board re-

solves that compliance is "essential and urgent," the Board may
"call upon" the DPRK to take whatever measures the Board resolves as necessary to ensure immediate compliance. 43 In such
resan Article 18 situation, the DPRK cannot appeal the Board's 44
completed.
are
measures
Agency-required
the
until
olution
In sum, the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement allows the DPRK to use nuclear materials in military applications
as long as those applications do not include the production of
nuclear weapons. 4- Within the scope of Article 14, the North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement limits the Agency's powers to verify that the DPRK's nuclear materials are being used in
military applications. 46 Nonetheless, if the Agency's powers to
verify a signatory's compliance under Article 14 are insufficient,
Articles 18 and 19 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement give the Agency broad powers to use should the
Board deem that the Agency's verification needs are "essential
and urgent." 47
140. Id.
141. Id. The full text of Article 18 states:
If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action
by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is essential and urgent in order
to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures
have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this agreement for the settlement
of a dispute [by means of arbitration].
Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. (seeking dispute resolution is not option for DPRK if Board decides
matter is essential and urgent).
145. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing DPRK's rights to
use nuclear materials in military applications).
146. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's curtailed
power to conduct safeguards when DPRK uses nuclear materials in military applications).
147. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's powers to
call upon DPRK to take immediate action when need to conduct safeguards is considered by Board to be "essential and urgent").
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II. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE CURRENT NORTH
KOREAN CRISIS
Seven years after ratifying the NPT, but otherwise in accordance with the Treaty,' 4 8 the DPRK signed an individually-negotiated safeguards agreement 49 with the Agency.' 5 ° However, interpretation disputes arose between the Agency and DPRK
nearly as soon as the agreement entered into force. Behind
these disputes lie differing views of how the NPT and the nuclear
nonproliferation regime should be interpreted.
A. The Problematic Implementation of the North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement
Until the 1990s, the Agency never found a case of non-compliance among NPT signatories.' 5' Despite several years of
Agency inspections in Iraq, 5 ' in 1992 the Agency discovered a
clandestine nuclear weapons program that was several years
old. 15 3 To enable the Agency to verify Treaty compliance more
effectively than it had in Iraq, Agency Director-General Hans
Blix proposed that the Agency allow members to submit intelligence concerning other member's nuclear activities.15 4 The
Agency's Board rejected this proposal because many Member
States opposed it.'5 5 Nonetheless, one month after North Korea
signed its safeguards agreement with the Agency, the Agency an148. NPT, supra note 2, art. 111(4), 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The NPT
requires parties that ratify the NPT to conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency within eighteen months of becoming an NPT party. Id.
149. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6.
150. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 2.
151. Monahan, supra note 6, at 162.
152. Rolf Ekeus, The U.N. Prevailed: Iraq had to Stand Down, WAsH. PoST, Aug. 6,
1992, at A25.
153. Id.
154. See Monahan, supra note 6, at 163.
155. Michael Wise, U.N. Agenuy Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspection, INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 27, 1992, at 14.
Agency members already have a duty to make available such information as would,
in the judgement of that member, be helpful to the Agency. IAEA Statute, supra note 6,
art. VIII(A), 8 U.S.T. at 1102, 729 U.N.T.S. at 18. However, under the terms of the
IAEA Statute, the Agency must use such data to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy, id. art. VIII(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1102, 729 U.N.T.S. at 18, rather than collective security
issues. Id. Specifically,
[t]he Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible form the
information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of this article. It
shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among its members of
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nounced that it would begin using data from157third-party intelligence sources 156 when enforcing safeguards.
Pursuant to the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement, the Agency began to confirm the DPRK's initial NPT compliance report of May 1992158 ("Initial Report") with ad hoc inspections of North Korea's declared nuclear sites. 159 The
Agency inspectors immediately found inconsistencies between
their own data and the DPRK's Initial Report. 61 In an effort to
resolve those inconsistencies, the Agency requested and received
from North Korea permission to inspect a one-story building
6
under military control in the Nyongbyon Research Center.' '
During their brief visit to and limited inspection of Nyongbyon
in September 1992, the Agency inspectors16 2found no signs of a
North Korean nuclear weapons program.
Despite the September inspection, the Agency still could
not resolve the original discrepancy between the Agency's and
the DPRK's data. 163 Moreover, subsequent information
given to the Agency by a third party"M indicated that the
Nyongbyon building had a secret, additional basement level
that the Agency had never inspected. 6 5 Two months later,
the Agency asked for additional data and inspection privileges,
including the right to inspect the alleged bottom floor of the
information relating to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy and
shall serve as an intermediary among its members for this purpose.
Id.
156. In this Note, a third-party intelligence source means that a first party (here,
the Agency) received intelligence information about a second party (here, the DPRK)
from a third party.
157. IAEA Press Release, IAEA Doc. PR 92/12 (Feb. 26, 1992).
158. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 2-3. The DPRK has an obligation to account
for its nuclear materials in reports to the Agency. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 69.
159. INFCIRG/419, supra note 20, at 2-3.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2. The DPRK claimed that the missing fuel from Nyongbyon's radiochemical laboratory was reprocessed, but the Agency could not find evidence confirming that explanation. Id.
164. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 3. The DPRK insists that the United States
was the third party which gave the Agency intelligence concerning Nyongbyon. DPRK
Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2. However, neither the Agency nor the
United States have ever confirmed or denied the DPRK's assertion that the third-party
intelligence source was the United States. See, e.g., INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 3
(admitting third-party sources used but not identifying third-party).
165. Id. at 3.
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Nyongbyon facility' 6 6
The North Koreans denied the Agency a second visit to Nyongbyon but agreed to discuss the issue of access. 167 At the January 1993 Agency-DPRK meeting, the Agency revealed that a third
party had passed intelligence to the Agency."' The third-party
intelligence indicated that a DPRK nuclear weapons facility existed in Nyongbyon's secret second basement.' 6 9 The DPRK responded first by objecting strenuously to the use of third-party
sources. 170 The DPRK also stated that the Nyongbyon building
7
was a military site not relevant to the DPRK's nuclear activities.' '
The Agency responded that it had reason to believe that access
to the Nyongbyon site was relevant to the implementation of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement.' 72 The Agency
also stated that, in view of the discrepancies between the DPRK
Initial Report and the Agency's inspections, the Agency7 3could
not ignore the third-party information in its possession.1
After the January 1993 meeting, the situation became increasingly confrontational.17 4 In February 1993, the Agency's
Board of Governors passed a resolution 175 declaring that access
to Nyongbyon was "essential and urgent."1 76 The United States
and South Korea announced the resumption of the Team
166. 1&. Later that month, the IAEA was careful to stress that its visit was only to
"ascertain [] the purpose and use of the spaces under the floor of the building." Id. at 4.
167. Id. A sixth team of IAEA inspectors were allowed into North Korea in January
1993. Id Although the DPRK provided additional information at this meeting, the
IAEA inspectors felt that the DPRK officials nonetheless failed to provide satisfactory
answers and complete documentation. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See i&. (stating that without better DPRK explanations of inconsistencies,
Agency could not ignore discrepancies).
174. See, e.g., A Chronology of the North Korean NuclearImpasse, Agence France Presse,
Feb. 16, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File [hereinafter Chronology] (reporting that Republic of Korea and United States decided to re-implement
Team Spirit); INFCIRC/419, supranote 20, at 6 (declaring that, in DPRK view, state of
semi-war" existed).
175. GOV/2636, supra note 63, at 1. Most importantly, the resolution stated that
the Board of Governors "[d] ecide [d] that access to additional information and [the] two

additional sites... [was] essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to
ensure verification of compliance with [the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement]." Id. at 2.
176. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 5.
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Spirit 177 joint military exercises on the southern Korean peninsula. 78 In response, less than two weeks later the DPRK declared a "state of semi-war"' 179 and8 0Pyongyang denied Agency inspectors entry into North Korea.1
On March 12, 1993, the Agency received a DPRK statement
declaring Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT ("DPRK Withdrawal Statement"). ' The DPRK Withdrawal Statement de177. See generally Chronology, supra note 174. Team Spirit is an annual military exercise that the United States conducted with the Republic of Korea on the Republic of
Korea's Territory. Id. The United States and the Republic of Korea suspended Team
Spirit when the DPRK ratified INFCIRC/403. Id.
178. Chronolog, supra note 174. The two countries had canceled Team Spirit as a
symbolic gesture after Pyongyang ratified INFCIRC/403. Id
179. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 6; see Letter of Choi Hak Gun, DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy, to Dr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (March 10, 1993) [hereinafter Choi March 10 Letter], in INFCIRC/419,
supra note 20, Annex 5. The text of Choi's letter alleges that:
I have several times mentioned our view, position and the solution regarding [the] clarification of "inconsistencies" and access of two additional sites
requested by you. Nevertheless some officials in the IAEA Secretariat involved
in the superpower's strategy against Korea presented the problems which
could have been solved without any difficulties through the ad hoc inspections
exaggeratedly in difference with reality to the February Board meeting, and
thereby [sic] Board adopt unjust resolution. It is very regretful for us.
Now the U.S. and South Korean authorities reopened the joint military
exercise "Team Spirit" which was ceased (sic] and they are conducting the [sic]
nuclear war exercise mobilizing the [sic] large-scale forces against us.
In this context our country has been put in the state of semi-war by the
order of the [DPRK's] Supreme Commander on March 8, 1993 ....
I have to inform you under the such political and military circumstances
created in our country that we could not but reserve consideration of the receipt of the [Agency's] inspection team concerning the implementation of the
unjust resolution of the February [Agency] Board meeting.
Choi March 10 Letter, supra.
180. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 6.
181. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1-4. The Statement says in
part:
A grave situation has been created today in our country, which threatens
its national sovereignty and the security of our State.
The United States and the south Korean authorities have defiantly resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal
against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and, in coincidence with this, some officials of the Secretariat of the Internat-ional [sic]
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and certain member nations following the lead
of the United States has a "resolution" adopted at the February 25 meeting of
the IAEA Board of Governors, demanding a special inspection of our military
sites unrelated to nuclear activities.
This is an encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK, an interference
in its internal affairs and a hostile act aimed at stifling our socialism.
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clared that North Korea intended to withdraw from the NPT because the Agency was acting with bias against the DPRK by using
third-party intelligence against the DPRK and by demanding special inspections of a military facility. 1 82 Four days later, the
DPRK asserted that the NPT's withdrawal clause precluded
18 3
Agency inspections during the three-month notice period.
Without inspections during the three-month notice period,
the Agency did not consider the DPRK's Withdrawal Statement
to be an effective statement of intent to withdraw from the
NPT.'8 4 One week after receiving the DPRK Withdrawal StateThe DPRK government... decisively rejects the unjust resolution of the
meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.
Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peace policy, the DPRK Government
joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and had since fulfilled its
obligations under the NPT in good faith. It was on the premise that the depository States of the NPT should neither deploy their nuclear weapons on the
Korean peninsular [sic] nor pose any nuclear threat against the DPRK that the
DPRK signed, the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and accepted IAEA
inspections.
Nevertheless, the United States remains unchanged, . . . far from fulfilling
its obligations under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon [sic] State to withdraw its
nuclear weapons from south Korea and remove its nuclear war threats against
the DPRK ...

If we submissively accept an unjust inspection by the IAEA, it would legitimize [sic] the espionage acts by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis
the DPRK, and set the beginning of the full exposure of all our military installations. Under our specific conditions in which the country still remains divided and exposed to the constant nuclear threats from the United States, it
will be totally inconceivable to lay our military sites open to the enemies....
All these facts evidently show that the United States, those forces hostile
to the DPRK and some officials of the IAEA secretariat are misapplying the
NPT to jeopardize the sovereignty and security of our country, a non-nuclear
weapon State, and stifle our socialist system....
The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declares
its decision to withdraw unavoidably from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as a measure to defend its supreme interests.
Id.
182. Id. at 2.
183. See Letter from Choi Hak Gun, DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy, to Dr. Hans
Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Mar. 16, 1993)
[hereinafter Choi March 16 Letter], in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 9, at 2 ("In
such circumstances, I make it clear that we cannot receive the Agency inspection
teams."); Letter from Choi Hak Gun, DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy, to Dr. Hans
Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Mar. 30, 1993), in
INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 12 ("I would like to reaffirm that the issue of 'special inspection' you insist [upon] could not be a matter of discussion.").
184. Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the Resolution Adopted by the
Board on 25 February 1993 (GOV/2636) and of the Agreement between the Agency and the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Koriafor the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty
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ment, the Agency's Board responded by passing a resolution 8 '
calling for the inspectors' immediate admission to Nyongbyon. 1 86 On April 1, the Board resolved

87

to report the

DPRK's non-compliance 88to the U.N. Security Council and the
U.N. General Assembly.1

In May 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution' 89 calling for the DPRK to reconsider its March 12 Withdrawal Statement and to honor its continuing NPT and North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement obligation to permit inspections during the three-month notice period. 90 For the remainder of 1993, the Agency and sometimes the United States
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the DPRK' 9 ' Meanwhile,
the Agency safeguards that remained in North Korea, such as
cameras and nuclear seals, expired. 92 In November 1993, the
on the Non-Prolferationof Nuclear Weapons, Bd. of Governors Res. 2639, IAEA Doc. GOV/
2639 (Mar. 29, 1993), in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 10, at 1 [hereinafter IAEA
Doc. GOV/2639]. The Board's resolutions also confirmed that the matter of Nyongbyon's inspection was still "essential and urgent." Id. at 2. The resolution also
stated that it found the Director-General's work to be "impartial and objective." Id. at 1.
185. Id. at 1.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the Resolution Adopted by the
Board on 25 February 1993 (GOV/2636) and of the Agreement between the Agency and the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Koreafor the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (INFcIRC/403), Bd. of Governors Res. 2645,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2645 (Apr. 1, 1993), in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 1, at 1-2
[hereinafter IAEA Doc. GOV/2645].
188. Id. at 2.
189. S.C. Res. 825, U.N. SCOR, 20 Sess., 3212th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/825 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 825]. Of the Security Council's fifteen members, thirteen voted
for the measure. U.N.Asks North Korea to Reverse NuclearNonproferationDecision, Agence
Presse France, May 11, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis library, CURNWS file. The other
two Security Council members, China and Pakistan, abstained. Id.
190. S.C. Res. 825, supra note 189, at 2.
191. See generally Chronology, supra note 174. The DPRK will not allow the Agency
to inspect Nyongbyon until the United States formally recognizes the DPRK's statehood. See Telex from DPRK Ho Jin Yun, Embassy Counselor, to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (February 20, 1994), quoted in Douglas Hamilton, Inspection on
Hold as JAEA Awaits North Korea-U.S. Talks, Reuters, Ltd., Feb. 21, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File ("The date of inspections must be coordinated with the date when the United States will take other measure[s]" related to DPRK,
such as economic aid or diplomatic recognition).
192. Anthony Goodman, U.N. Calls on N. Korea. to Comply with Nuclear Treaty,
Reuters, Nov. 1, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File [hereinafter
U.N. Calls on N. Korea]. IAEA Director-General Hans Blix said, referring to the cameras:
"I can tell you that we believe they have run out probably several weeks ago-run out of
film and run out of electricity. So they are no longer taking any pictures." Id.
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U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution 193 noting that the
DPRK's area of non-compliance was widening and called upon
the DPRK to comply with the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement.
As of October 1994, North Korea still considers itself withdrawn 1 94 from the NPT. 195 Yet the Agency still denies that the
DPRK's Withdrawal Statement started the three-month notice
period running 9 ' and insists that the NPT and the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement require the DPRK to allow
Agency inspectors to enter Nyongbyon. 197 As of October 1994,
the DPRK has refused to allow Agency inspectors into Nyongbyon.

1 98

193. Report of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, GA. Res. 48, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Supp. No. - at -. , U.N. Doc. A/Res/48 (1993) [hereinafter GA. Res. 48]. The
vote was 140-1-9. U.N. Calls on N. Korea, supra note 192. The only nation opposing the
measure was the DPRK itself. Id. Speaking before the vote, DPRK U.N. envoy Pak Gil
Yon stated that the General Assembly's draft was "an insidious political offensive aimed
at international pressure and [North Korea] categorically rejects it." Id.
194. See supra note 181 (reiterating text of DPRK Withdrawal Statement and DPRK
assertion of right to partially withdraw).
195. Hubbard in Seoul for Talks on North Korean NuclearIssue, Agence France Presse,
Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File (quoting Korean
Central News Agency, official DPRK news agency).
196. Telephone interview with Marlene O'Dell, IAEA Press Officer, International
Atomic Energy Agency (Sep. 15, 1994).
197. Id. As of September 1994, the Agency recognizes that the DPRK is no longer
a signatory to the IAEA Statute, but is still a NPT signatory. Id.
198. Evan S. Medeiros, North Korea Plays the Same Old Hand, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRiB., Oct. 16, 1994, at G4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File.
At this Note's press time, the United States reached an agreement with the DPRK
concerning the "nuclear tensions" on the Korean Peninsula. Philippe Debeusscher, US,
Pyongyang Sign NuclearAccord, Pledge NormalizationEfforts, Agence Press France (Oct. 21,
1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis World News File [hereinafter US, Pyongyang Sign]. Two
of the agreement's six pages are confidential. Id. According to the public pages of the
pact, the United States pledged oil deliveries to North Korea in return for a freeze on
the DPRK's current nuclear program. Id. While the agreement gives the Agency some
immediate inspection rights, id., North Korea does not need to open up Nyongbyon to
full Agency inspections until 1999. Korea Risked War jf Negotiations Had Not Succeeded.
Gallucci, Agence Press France (Oct. 21, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis World News
File. Agency Director-General Hans Blix has expressed concern about the five-year delay in inspections. Id.
In addition, the United States will lead an international consortium that will build
and pay for a US$4 billion light water reactor in North Korea. US, Pyongyang Sign,
supra. North Korea will not be able to reprocess radioactive waste from the light-water
reactors into materials required for nuclear weapon production. Id. In return for the
light-water reactors, the DPRK will be required to dismantle its current nuclear reactors. Id.
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B. The DPRK's and the Agency's Differing Interpretationsof Their
Legal Rights Under the NonproliferationRegime
The current dispute sets the DPRK's alleged right not to allow the Agency's inspectors into military bases 9 9 against the
Agency's claim that its inspectors have the right to enter any territory under Pyongyang's control.2 0 0 At the core of the controversy, however, lies an important and unresolved issue in international law: defining the legal scope of a state's sovereignty
when that sovereignty conflicts with a law of global collective security. The establishment of the regime represented the first
time that such national and international security issues had
law for a
been regulated, thereby creating binding international
201
arose.
conflict
current
the
before
years
of
score
1. The DPRK's View: The Withdrawal Is Effective Because the
Agency Has Violated North Korea's Sovereignty
North Korea argues that not only has the Agency violated
the DPRK's national sovereignty but also that the Agency's violations permits the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT. 2 To support this position, the DPRK first contends that Article 14 of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement allows the DPRK to
suspend safeguards when using nuclear materials in non-proscribed military activities.20 3 Second, the DPRK alleges that the
Agency violated its duty to treat its members as equally sovereign

199. See INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14 (agreeing to re-arrange safeguard procedures when nuclear materials are used in military applications).
200. See id. art. 1 (DPRK "undertakes... to accept safeguards, in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable materials in all peaceful
nuclear activities within its territory... for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such
material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices").
201. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1588, supra note 20. The law of global collective security
seems ready to halt a violation of such security before that violation is fully completed
and thus requires force to remedy. See id. (mandating need for United Nations to respond with force to remedy North Korean breach of global collective security because
United Nations could only remedy situation after breach was committed).
202. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20; see supra note 181 (reiterating
text of DPRK Withdrawal Statement).
203. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14.
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nations 2°4 by accepting third-party information. 205 Third, Pyongyang asserts that a state of hostilities20 6 exists that allows the

DPRK, under customary international law, 07 to withdraw from
the Treaty.2 08 Under the North Korean interpretation, these developments permit the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT.20 9

a. The DPRK Satisfied Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency

Safeguards Agreement
The DPRK argues that it had met the terms of Article

14210

in good faith. 2 1 ' As the DPRK points out, Article 14 recognizes

method
Agency safeguards cannot be applied in their usual 212
Artiapplications.
military
in
used
are
materials
when nuclear
cle 14 guarantees that any DPRK arrangement with the Agency
regarding nuclear materials used in military applications shall
not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military
activity.213 Article 14 only requires the DPRK to identify, to the
204. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Agency duty to treaty all
members as equally sovereign).
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (detailing how Agency received
intelligence pertaining to North Korea from third party).
206. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (describing North Korean view
that "state of semi-war" exists).
207. See supra note 7 (defining customary international law).
208. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (containing North Korea's assertion that "state of semi-war" exists and totality of circumstances permits DPRK withdrawal from Treaty).
209. See supra note 181 (reiterating DPRK Withdrawal Statement's'position that
NPT withdrawal clause permits North Korean withdrawal in these circumstances).
210. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (reviewing Article 14 of North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
211. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 3. But see Leonard S. Spector,
Nuclear Proliferationin the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull, in NEw THRaATs: RESPONDING
TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NucLEAR, CHEMICAL AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD
WoRLD 32, 38 (Aspen Strategy Group eds., 1990). Spector reiterates a common belief
that Pyongyang deliberately delayed conducting any sort of safeguards agreement and
misused its NPT membership for military prowess. Id.
212. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14. During a series of talks between Agency
Director General Blix and the DPRK's Minister of Atomic Energy Choi, Choi repeatedly
objected to a Nyongbyon inspection and insisted that the Agency did not have the authority to demand inspections of North Korean military sites. INFCIRC/419, supra note
20, at 4; see also DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2 ("As for an inspection

of the military installation in question, it has nothing to do at all with the inspections
under the Safeguards Agreement, and it is a matter outside the competency of the
1AEA.").
213. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14(c).
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extent possible,214 the circumstances of military use. The DPRK
is not obligated to report everything to the Agency, particularly
anything that involves approval or classified knowledge of the
military activity or that relates to the use of nuclear materials
therein. 2 1- Thus, Pyongyang believes it has a right to withhold
some information from the Agency where the Nyongbyon facility
is concerned. 1 6 In keeping with this legal interpretation, Pyong21 7
yang points to the fact that Nyongbyon is a military institution
and that North Korea sought to make special safeguards arrangements with the Agency regarding Nyongbyon. 218 Further-

more, every time the Agency found an inconsistency, the DPRK
cooperated with additional, though not complete, information.2 19
Pyongyang also reads Article 14 of the North KoreanAgency Safeguards Agreement as a separate article that is as important as any other article in the Agreement. Thus, although
Article 1 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement
claims the Agency has the right 220 to implement safeguards anywhere in DPRK territory, 221 the DPRK interprets Article 14 as an
exception to Article 1, rather than subordinate to it.2 22 Accord214. Id art. 14(b).
215. Id. art. 14(c).
216. See, e.g., DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2 (claiming military
inspections are outside competency of Agency).
217. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 3-4.
218. Id. The Agency's own report noted that the Nyongbyon building always appeared to be under military control. Id.
219. See, e.g., id. at 3 (stating that after discrepancies could not be accounted for,
IAEA inspectors were allowed to briefly visit Nyongbyon in September, 1992); id.
(describing November 1992 meeting at IAEA headquarters, where DPRK agreed to
sixth inspection); id. at 4 (describingJanuary 1993 meeting in DPRK of senior Agency
and DPRK officials); id. (stating that sixth inspection team allowed into DPRK but not
Nyongbyon building).
Minister Choi also alleged that Director Blix breached an agreement with the
DPRK to resolve inconsistencies through bilateral consultations. Choi March 16 Letter,
supra note 183, at 1. Choi wrote that Blix needlessly internationalized the discrepancies
by neglecting the DPRK's sincere efforts for clarification and placing an "unjust resolution" before the Agency's Board. Id. at 1-2.
220. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 1. Article 1 also explicitly states that this
right stems from Article III(1) of the NPT. Id.; see NPT, art. III(I), supra note 2, 21
U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (stating that each non-nuclear-weapon signatory
agrees to accept safeguards as set forth in signatory's future bilateral agreement with
Agency). For the complete text of the Article III of the NPT, see supra note 113.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2 (claiming military
inspections are outside competency of Agency).
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ingly, the DPRK argues that it has complied with the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement by choosing to meet the requirements of Article 14 instead of the requirements of Article
1.223 Hence, the DPRK asserts that it has rights under the North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement 22 4 that allow it to exclude
Agency inspectors from the Nyongbyon building.225 Thus, the
North Korean Foreign Ministry has stated that an attempt to
is tantamount to an atforce Agency inspections of Nyongbyon 226
tempt to drive it out of the NPT Treaty.
b. The Agency's Duty to Treat Its Members as Equally
Sovereign States
The DPRK alleges that the Agency has breached its duty to
treat all members of the Agency as equally sovereign 2 27 by using
third-party information against North Korea without similarly reacting to DPRK-furnished intelligence regarding other Agency
members. 22 8 No part of the IAEA Statute, the NPT, or the North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement explicitly permits use of
third-party sources. Consequently, the DPRK points out that the
Agency's use of third-party information asks the DPRK to legitimize espionage acts by the United States, a belligerent party visd-vis the DPRK.2 2 9 Pyongyang also claims that the United
States 23 0 fabricated 23 1 information designed to demand the
opening of the DPRK's military sites,23 2 thus lessening the
DPRK's equally sovereign standing among Agency Member
States. Furthermore, Pyongyang asserts that Agency officials
have ignored North Korean demands for reciprocal inspections
223. See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (claiming that DPRK has met its safeguards obligations in

good faith and that military obligations are outside Agency's competency).
224. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14.
225. See DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2 ("As for an inspection of
the military installation in question, it has nothing to do at all with the inspections
under the Safeguards Agreement, and it is a matter outside the competency of the
LAEA.).
226. Douglas Hamilton, North Korea Links Nuclear Inspections to U.S. Talks, Reuters,
Feb. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File.
227. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. IV(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 10.
228. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
229. Id. at 2.
230. See supra note 164 (discussing identity of Agency's third-party intelligence
source).
231. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
232. Id.
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233 Simiof military bases in South Korea and the United States.
larly, the DPRK alleges that while the Agency has been pressing
Pyongyang for access to Nyongbyon, the Agency has also been
simultaneously approving Japanese and South Korean moves towards nuclear armaments. 3 4
Next, the DPRK asserts that the Agency breached its duty to
treat all Agency members equally2 5 by allowing other Agency
Member States to threaten North Korea with nuclear attack in
violation of the NPT's collective security pledges. 2 6 The DPRK
claims it acceded to the NPT with the understanding that, upon
its accession, none of the NPT depository states 23 7 would pose
any nuclear threat against North Korea. 23 8 However, Pyongyang
views Team Spirit as a "nuclear war rehearsal" against the
DPRK 23 9 Despite Pyongyang's post-ratification expectations that
other NPT signatories would cease threatening the DPRK with
nuclear weapons, the Agency did not request that the United
States pull its nuclear weapons out of South Korea.24 ° In the

face of these facts, especially when viewed with the Agency's decision to use U.S. intelligence against North Korea, the DPRK believes that it must react to what it sees as an Agency policy to
favor the United States at the DPRK's expense by withdrawing
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. VI(C), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 10.
DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 2; see supra notes 73-83 and

accompanying text (describing NPT's security provisions).
237. NPT, supra note 2, art. XI, 1 3, 21 U.N.T.S. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 179. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union are the NPT depository
states. Id.
238. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1.
239. Id. However, the United States and South Korea claim "a complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons" has been achieved in South Korea. 1992 U.N. DIsANmAMENTY.B 189. Nonetheless, the DPRK calls these statements trickery. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1-2.
On February 15, 1994, the DPRK and the IAEA came to an initial agreement allowing the IAEA to inspect and place safeguards on some sites, but not Nyongbyon.
U.S. Welcomes North Korean Decision to Allow Inspections, Agence Presse France, Feb. 16,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File. To reach this agreement,
the United States canceled Team Spirit as a concession to the DPRK. Id.
240. See DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1 ("It was on the premise
that the depository States of the NPT should neither [sic] deploy their nuclear weapons
against the DPRK that the DPRK signed the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and
accepted IAEA inspections."); id. at 4 ("The DPRK's principled stand will remain unchanged until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the DPRK and the
IAEA Secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality.").
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from the NPT. 24 1 Such alleged double-dealing by the Agency
would be also a violation of the Agency's statute.2 4 2
c. Sovereignty and the NPT Withdrawal Clause
The DPRK ultimately argues that the alleged U.S. plots to
manipulate the Agency for western intelligence purposes and to
increase tactical South Korean nuclear threats are an interference with North Korea's internal affairs.2 4 3 Pyongyang asserts
that such interferences with North Korea's internal affairs are
hostile acts aimed at stifling the DPRK's socialism and thus violate the its sovereignty. 24 4 The DPRK argues that it has no
choice but to withdraw from the NPT as a measure to defend its
supreme interests. 24 5 First, the DPRK has the right of national
sovereignty in customary international law.24 6 Under customary
international law, a state does not have to relinquish its sovereignty to either a hostile state or an international organization
that is successfully manipulated by that hostile state. 24 7 Furthermore, under customary international law, hostilities that cumulate in war would legally permit the DPRK to immediately with2 48
draw from the Treaty.
Second, the NPT's and the IAEA Statute's unusually explicit
emphasis on national sovereignty permits North Korea to argue
that the DPRK is entitled to withdraw from the NPT and the
241. See id. at 2 ("It is on the basis of the 'intelligence information' fabricated by
the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the DPRK, that some officials of the IAEA
Secretariat are trying to enforce inspection of our major military installations which are
unrelated to nuclear activities.").
242. See IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III (B) (7), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at
10 (describing Agency's duty to treat all members as equally sovereign); Implementation
of the Agreement between the Agency and theDemocratic People's Republic of Koreafor the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolferation of Nuclear Weapons,
IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVII)/Res/624, at 2 (1993) (resolving that Agency has been impartial).
243. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 4.
246. See supra note 13 (defining national sovereignty).
247. See supra note 7 (defining customary international law);JassuP, supra note 13,
at 41 (discussing states' right to withdraw from treaty obligations when confronted with
acts of aggression).
248. SeeJassup, supra note 13, at 41 (discussing states' right to withdraw from treaty
obligations when confronted with acts of aggression).
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IAEA Statute. 249 Although treaties rarely refer to national sovereignty,2 ° both the NPT and the IAEA Statute explicitly mention
national sovereignty. 251 Thus, the DPRK asserts that this unusually explicit emphasis upon sovereignty allows Pyongyang to reject the Agency's "unjustified resolution forced by the United
States upon [the Agency's Board]" 25 2 to protect North Korea's

"supreme interests".253
2. The Agency's View: The DPRK Withdrawal Is Ineffective
and the Agency Has the Right to Inspect Nyongbyon
Under the Agency's view, the DPRK is in violation of the
NPT both by the terms of the Treaty itself and by the intent of
the regime as a whole." 4 The Agency argues that Article 14
must be read as part of the entire North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement as well as part of the whole nonproliferation
regime. 255 The Agency also argues that the use of third-party

intelligence neither biases the Agency nor breaches its duty of
impartiality. 256 The Agency further asserts that each NPT signatory has agreed to relinquish some of its sovereignty to the
Agency when the signatory ratifies the NPT. 257 Finally, the
249. NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175; IAEA Statute,
supra note 2, art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8.
250. HENKIN, supra note 13, at 13.
251. See NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. The NPT
mentions sovereignty in its withdrawal clause. Id.; see supra note 20 (reiterating withdrawal clause text). The NPT withdrawal clause was derived in part from the 1965
Soviet Draft Treaty, which extols sovereignty. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying
text (discussing history of non-proliferation regime's draft treaties). The IAEA Statute
promises the Agency shall always function with due observance of a member's sovereignty. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1097, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8; see
supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing IAEA Statute's commitment to
each Member State's sovereignty).
252. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 4.
253. Choi March 16 Letter, supra note 183, at 2.
254. See, e.g., INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 5-7 (incorporating portions of IAEA
Statute, NPT, and North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement when defining DPRK's
duties under nonproliferation regime).
255. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, to Choi Hak Gun, DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy (March 19,
1993), available in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 11 [hereinafter Blix March 19
Letter] (stating that targeted inspection sites of military nature in no way immunizes
such sites from Agency inspections).
256. See, e.g., id (stating that Agency Secretariat endeavors to implement safeguards in DPRK objectively and impartially).
257. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2639, supra note 184, at 2 (confirming that North Ko-

266

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURINAL

[Vol. 18:229

Agency does not view a statement of intent to withdraw under
the NPT as an effective NPT withdrawal if inspections cannot be
conducted during the three month notice period. 8
a. Reading Article 14 in Context
In the Agency's view, Article 14 must be read in light of the
NPT and entire the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement.2 59 The Agency argues that Article 14 must be read as one
of many parts in the entire North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement. 26 0 The Agency further argues that the entire North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement should be read in light of
the NPT and the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime.2 6 '
The Agency believes that the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement should be read as a whole. 62 Article 1 of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement states that the
DPRK agrees to let the Agency inspect any territory within its
control. 26 This general promise is derived from the NPT itself 2 64 and is, in the Agency's view, an overriding commitment of
the NPT regime. Article 14 promises the Agency the right to be
kept informed of the total quantity and composition of unsafeguarded nuclear material used in military applications. 65
The Agency believes that the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement already provides that right, as well as the right to inrean-Agency Safeguards Agreement stays in force until withdrawal is effective and DPRK
has duty to comply with verification).
258. See, e.g., id. (stating Agency view that urgent inspections must be conducted
despite DPRK notice of intent to withdraw).
259. See, e.g., INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 1-4 (beginning Agency's presentation of case with review of NPT's Article III(1)); id., attachment (quoting the IAEA
Statute's Article XII(C)).
260. See id. (citing other North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement provisions
in support of Agency's position that Agency has right to conduct safeguards in military
installations).
261. See INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 6 (stating that safeguards continue as
long as DPRK is party to NPT).
262. See Blix March 19 Letter, supra note 255 (stating that targeted inspection sites
of military nature in no way immunizes sites from IAEA inspections); INFCIRC/419,
supra note 20, at 8 (reiterating duties of DPRK under Article 18 of the North-Korean
Agency Safeguards Agreement).
263. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 1.
264. See NPT, supra note 2, art. III(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172
(stating that each signatory agrees to accept safeguards anywhere in its territory).
265. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14.
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spect the entire Nyongbyon premises.266 For example, Article 28
of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement specifies
that the objective of all safeguards is the timely detection of significant quantities of nuclear materials.267 In addition, Article
77 allows the Agency Board to decide urgent disputes regarding
access to special inspections.2
The Agency also asserts that the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement must be read within the context of the
NPT.269 NPT Article III, paragraph 1 states that as long as the
Agency is acting for the exclusive purpose of verification, it has
the right to enter all of the signatory's territory.270 The Agency
has repeatedly given the DPRK assurances that it would only
enter Nyongbyon's second basement to ensure verification, and
thus claims right of entry.2 71 Even though Article 14 of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement permits the suspension of safeguards in military applications, the NPT Article
III right of access supersedes Article 14.
b. The Agency's Duty to Be Impartial
The Agency denies that using third-party intelligence
266. See INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 8-10 (citing INFCIRC/403, supra note 6,
art. 3 (pledge of co-operation); id art. 18 (stating IAEA's Board of Governor's right to
require inspections); id. art. 71 (stating Agency's right to make ad hoc inspections); id.
art. 73 (stating Agency's right to make special inspections); id. art. 77 (reviewing
Agency's right to make special inspections)); see also Blix March 19 Letter, supra note
255. In his March 19 letter, Blix said:
I am aware of your statements that the two additional sites which we wish
to visit are military. While this in no way immunizes them from inspection, we
are ready to discuss arrangements which might minimize security concerns, if
such can be found that do not reduce the effectiveness of inspection, including sample taking.
Id.
267. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 28.
268. Id. art. 77.
269. See INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 6 (reiterating that DPRK's safeguards duties exist as long as DPRK is NPT signatory); NPT, supra note 2, art. III(1), 21 U.S.T. at
487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (stating that non-nuclear-weapon signatories agree to accept safeguards); supra note 113 (reiterating text of Article 111(1) of NPT).
270. NPT, supra note 2, art. 111(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
271. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, to Choi Hak Gun, DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy (Mar. 12,
1993), in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 8 [hereinafter Blix March 12 Letter] (stating that the sole objective of safeguards is to seek clarity about nuclear activities in
DPRK); Blix March 19 Letter, supra note 255 (stating Agency willingness to discuss
measures needed to ensure verification compliance).
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sources biases the Agency.27 2 The Agency points out that it has a
duty created by the IAEA Statute to report any member's noncompliance to the Director General, and if necessary the Board,
and finally the U.N. Security Council. 27 After the Agency's failure to detect undeclared sites in Iraq, Director-General Blix declared that the Agency would need access to additional information, relevant locations, and the U.N. Security Council's sanction
power 274 to effectuate its verification duties in recalcitrant
States. 275 The Agency announced in its February 1992 Press Release 2 76 that the Board of Governors now considered itself authorized to receive information from outside sources.2 7 7 Given
the Agency's duty to report a lack of verification 27 8 and the sixmonth-old unresolvable discrepancies of Pyongyang's Initial Report, the Agency argues that it could not ignore the third-party
information.2 7 9
c. The Agency Response to the DPRK's Claim of Self-Defense
and Collective Security
The Agency does not perceive that the DPRK is being
threatened in such a way as to justify a claim of self-defense. The
Agency has commented officially that the DPRK's claims of selfdefense as a "state of semi-war" 2 ° is insufficient justification for
272. Blix March 19 Letter, supra note 255 (finding Choi's assertion that Agency

lacks impartiality and objectivity unfair).
273. See INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, attachment (quoting Article XII(C) of IAEA

Statute and Article 19 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
274. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41. The U.N. Security Council has the power to impose
sanctions that disrupt economic or diplomatic relations as needed to give effect to its
decisions. Id.

275. Hans Blix, Statement to the 35th Session of the General Conference of
Atomic Energy, at 7-9 (Sept. 16, 1991), reprinted in IAEA Doc. IAEA/PI/C.18E (1991).
Blix also suggested the establishment of a small, two-person unit within the Director-

General's office to evaluate the need for special inspections by reviewing any reports
from Member States concerning the nuclear activities of the other NPT States, but this

proposal was abandoned due to resistance from Member States as well as a lack of
funds. M. Wise, U.N. Agency Tightens Rulesfor Nuclear Inspection, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 27,

1992, at 14.
276. IAEA Press Release, IAEA Doc. PR 92/12 (Feb. 26, 1992).
277. Id.
278. See IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(B), 8 U.S.T at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8

(requiring Agency to submit reports, when appropriate, to U.N. Security Council);
INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, arts. 18-19 (describing measures Agency may take to report
its inability to verify NPT compliance).
279. INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 4.
280. Choi March 10 Letter, supra note 179.
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refusal of an NPT inspection team.2
Some Agency members,
such as Japan and South Korea, have publicly criticized the
DPRK's attempt to link the Team Spirit issue with obligations
voluntarily assumed under international law.28 2
The Agency's Director-General, Hans Blix, recognizes two
operative definitions of "aggression. '2 3 Under Blix' first definition, aggression is whatever the majority deems in good conscience. 4 Under this definition, the unanimous U.N. General
Assembly vote constitutes proof that Team Spirit is not an aggressive act.2 85 According to Blix' second definition, a State
commits an act of aggression if it does not, within a specified
period of time, comply with the orders and take steps requested
by international organizations.28 No international organization
has demanded the cancellation of Team Spirit, although some
Agency members have called it part of a breach of international
law.28 7 Under this definition, the DPRK's refusal to allow an
Agency inspection of Nyongbyon, despite unanimous U.N. resolutions2 8srequiring such inspections, is an act of aggression
against the world.
Blix also argues that the world should recognize collective
security28 9 laws on a par with the customary law"9 ° of sovereignty.2 9' Blix even interprets the U.N. Charter as promoting
281. Letter from Hans Blix to Minister Choi, Minister of Atomic Energy, DPRK,
(March 10, 1993), in INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, annex 6, (quoting IAEA Board of
Governors February 9 resolution that access to Nyongbyon is "essential and urgent"); see
Blix March 19 Letter, supra note 255 (stating that denial of entry constitutes NPT noncompliance).
282. N. Korean Inspections Going Smoothly Says IAEA, Japan Economic Newswire,
Dec. 4. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES News File.
283. HANS BLx, SOVEIGNmNTv, AGGRESSION AND NEUTRAUrfl.

THREE LEcrURES BY

HANS BLIx 36 (Almquist & Wiksells, Stockholm, 1970) [hereinafter BLIx, SOVERErNT].
284. Id. at 36.
285. GA. Res. 48, supra note 193.
286. BLix, SOVEREIGNTr, supra note 283, at 36. Blix recognizes this as a procedural
definition. Id.
287. See, e.g., China: Beifing Backs New Nucear Export Rules at U.N., Interpress Service, Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD News File (reiterating
People's Republic of China official's statement of U.S. response to the crisis as that of
"hegemonic.... self-styled world cop who tramples upon international law").
288. See, e.g., supra note 193 (describing 140 to 1 vote for U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 48); supra note 7 (discussing customary international law and unanimous
U.N. General Assembly resolutions as source thereof).
289. See supra note 1 (defining collective security).
290. See supra note 7 (defining customary international law).
291. Bux, SOVEREIGNT, supra note 283, at 12.
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collective security before national sovereignty.2 92 According to
Blix, a state can make requests that another state cannot reject as
an improper interference if the request concerns matters affected by some international obligation.2 93
d. National Sovereignty and the Withdrawal Clause
Under the Agency's view, a state's sovereignty is composed
of many alienable sovereign rights. 29 4 In other words, the
Agency believes that a state that agrees to give away one sovereign right still retains many other sovereign rights and thus remains a sovereign state. 295 Therefore, the Agency believes that
its demands for enforcement of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement ask for no more of the DPRK's sovereignty
than the DPRK voluntarily gave when ratifying its safeguards
agreement with the Agency.
Blix defines national sovereignty as that state's freedom of
action that is unaffected by any rules of customary or treaty
law.29 6 Thus, the Agency stresses that the DPRK voluntarily ratified the NPT in 1985 as well as the 1992 North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement.2 97 Furthermore, in Blix' view, if ownership is described as a bundle of sticks, sovereignty is like a bundle of competencies. 29 1 Under Blix' view, a state can give up a
292. See id. at 13. As a delegate to the 1967 U.N. Committee on judicial Principles,
Blix commented:
It would seem to my delegation that a second sphere in which a duty for
States to co-operate may without hesitation be laid down in general terms relates to the preservation of the properties of the planet: [for example] an atmosphere free from dangerous radio-active fallout .... States may legitimately
be required to co-operate to ensure its proper administration.
Id. at 22.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 11-12.
295. Id. at 11.
296. See id at 12 (discussing how sovereignty is untouched when other states that
have an interest under customary or treaty law ask for that interest to be fulfilled).
297. Telephone interview with Marlene O'Dell, Press Officer, International
Atomic Energy Agency (Sep. 15, 1994); see INFCIRC/419, supra note 20, at 1 (reiterating North Korean ratification of NPT and North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
298. Id. at 12 (citing as a comparison HENKIN H. KELSEN, PRINCIPALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (1952) and A. ORs, A TEXT-BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 46-47 (1947)).
Blix also notes that this rule might not apply if the proposed measures imply the abandonment or sharing of vital resources. BLrx, SOVEmIGNTY, supra note 283, at 12.
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sovereign right in a treaty without giving up sovereignty.2 99
Thus, according to the Agency's interpretation, just because
Pyongyang chose to give away its sovereign right to expel Agency
inspectors who seek verification does not mean that any other
aspect of the DPRK's sovereignty has been damaged. In addition, because treaties are usually terminable, a state can always
reclaim its plenary powers.3 00 Indeed, Blix feels that the voluntary assumption of treaty obligations is not a limitation but
rather an expression of state sovereignty.301 Under this view, the
global community has every right to demand that the DPRK adhere to its voluntarily assumed treaty obligations, including the
withdrawal clause, without feeling forcibly deprived of any national sovereignty.
Finally, the Agency claims that Pyongyang's interpretation
of the withdrawal provision is ineffective. 0 2 First, the NPT withdrawal clause requires three months notice.303 Under the
Agency's interpretation of the withdrawal clause, the notice period cannot toll until the DPRK has upheld its obligations under
the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement procedures for
three months after the notice of intended withdrawal is tendered. 0 4 Thus, the Agency does not see the DPRK's statement
of intent to withdraw as effectively triggering the three month
notice of withdrawal period because the DPRK will not allow required inspections to take place during that three-month period.3 0 5
299. Id. at 11. In other words, Blix believes that a state can give away one stick and
still be left with a bunch of sovereignty. Id. at 12.

300. Id. at 12.
301. Id. (citing Case of the S.S. Wimbledon (U.K, Fr., It., Jap. v. Germ.), 1923
P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17)).
302. Telephone Interview with Marlene O'Dell, Press Officer, International
Atomic Energy Agency (Sept. 15, 1994).
303. See supra note 181 (reiterating NPT withdrawal clause's text).
304. Blix March 12 Letter, supra note 271. The day the DPRK's Withdrawal Statement was received, Dr. Blix felt
bound to point out that the Treaty and the [North Korea-Agency] Safeguards
Agreement remain duly in force until any withdrawal takes effect, i.e., after
three months advance notice to all other Parties and to the United Nations
Security Council. It follows that a declaration of intention to withdraw from
the NPT shall not impede the implementation of the [North Korean-Agency]
Safeguards Agreement.
Id.
305. Telephone Interview with Marlene O'Dell, Press Officer, International
Atomic Energy Agency (Sep. 15, 1994).
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III. THE NUCLEAR NONPROLLFERATION REGIME GIVES THE
AGENCY THE RIGHT TO INSPECT NYONGBYON
Although the North Korean interpretation points out legal
weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the Agency
verification of Nyongbyon's nuclear materials should be completed. First, progressive views of the rules of treaty interpretation, collective security, and national sovereignty all favor the
completion of Agency's verification process. The United Nations must resolve the current DPRK-Agency dispute in the light
of the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime and not just the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. 05 Thus, Article
14 must be read in light of the entire North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement, the NPT, the IAEA Statute, and the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Second, although the Agency needs to
develop laws that regulate incoming intelligence from thirdparty sources with guaranteed impartiality and reliability, the
purpose of the regime nonetheless mandates that the DPRK respond to the third-party information. Third, the DPRK claim of
being threatened is too weak to constitute a valid reason for
Treaty withdrawal. Finally, the Agency's interpretation of the
NPT withdrawal clause is the superior one, as the DPRK view
conflicts with the terms of the Treaty as well as the overarching
purposes of the entire nonproliferation regime.
A. Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency Agreement Is a
Subordinate Clause
North Korea has violated the terms of Article 14 by falling
to: (i) clearly inform the Agency that safeguards would be sus306. See Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, art.
31 (2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating that treaties shall be interpreted in light of other agreements relating to the treaty).
The Vienna Convention is largely a codification of existing customary international
law and thus constitutes a useful depository of international legal rules. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 15 (1988); see supra note 7 (defining customary
international law). The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but the
U.S. Department of State recognizes the treaty as the accepted guide to international
treaty law and practice. JANiS, supra, at 15.

A basic tenant of international law reflected in the Vienna convention is PactaSunt
Servanda. See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339, 8 I.L.M. at 690.
Pacta Sunt Servanda means that a signatory's treaty obligation must be performed in
good faith. Id. If the signatory does not perform that obligation in good faith, the
signatory has committed a material breach of the treaty. Id.
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pended,3 0 7 and (ii) make arrangements that reinstitute safeguards for material used in military applications. 08 Article 14
should also be read within the context of the entire North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. 09 Similarly, the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement must be read as a part of the
nonproliferation regime, with the IAEA Statute and the NPT as
the regime's primary written representatives.310 But interpreting
the dispute in light of the written laws alone is nearly impossible
because the statutes themselves value state sovereignty differently.3 1 ' Therefore, the nonproliferation regime must be inter-

preted not only in light of its written laws, but also with a view
that includes a growing body of customary international law.
North Korea's argument that it has met the requirements of
Article 14 in good faith is dubious. 12 Because the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement is the most recent written
law in the regime, the DPRK is obligated to abide by its terms,
Pacta Sunt Servanda.1 3 Under Article 14 of the North KoreanAgency Safeguards Agreement, the DPRK has a duty to clearly
inform the Agency that safeguards will be suspended and that
the unsafeguarded material will not be used in proscribed activities.3

14

However, the DPRK never informed the Agency that un-

307. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (reviewing requirement in Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement that DPRK clearly inform
Agency that safeguards would be suspended because nuclear materials would be used in
non-proscribed military applications).
308. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (reviewing requirements in Article 14 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement, mandating that DPRK make
arrangements with Agency to suspend safeguards).
309. See supra notes 259-68 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's view that
Article 14 of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement should be read as
subordinate clause).
310. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's entire regime view).
311. Compare supra notes 49-57 (reviewing Article III(D) of IAEA Statute, which
requires that Agency function in due observance of member's sovereignty) with supra
notes 105-10 (reiterating NPT's provision allowing withdrawal in expression of Member
States' sovereignty and supreme interests) and supra notes 139-47 (reviewing Agency's
right to enter DPRK territory when verification is "essential and urgent").
312. See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text (discussing DPRK claims that it
has met Article 14 terms in good faith).
313. Vienna Convention, supra note 06, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339, 8 I.L.M. at
690; see supra note 306 (discussing Pacta Sunt Servanda).
314. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14.
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safeguarded materials existed.3 15 Furthermore, Article 14 clearly
states that in any event and at all times, the Agency shall be kept
informed of the total quality and composition of such unsafeguarded materials but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity therein. 31 6 The arrangement must also identify, to the extent possible, the period or
317
North
circumstances during which safeguards shall not apply.
taking
before
arrangement
an
such
create
to
Korea never sought
318
basement.
second
the nuclear material to Nyongbyon's secret
Also under Article 14, the DPRK must arrange with the Agency
for immediate re-application of safeguards when the materials
process.3 1 9 North Korea has yet to
re-enter the peaceful nuclear
3 20
make such an arrangement.
Article 14 must also be read in the context of the entire the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. For example, Article 1 of the North Korean-Agency Agreement states that the
basic undertaking of the Safeguards Agreement is the DPRK's
commitment to accept Agency safeguards anywhere in North Korean territory. 32 1 When read together, the agreement's basic undertaking and statement of Pyongyang's duty to make clear that
the unsafeguarded materials are not being used for proscribed
purposes force the DPRK to bear the burden of proof and con3 22
vince the Agency that the third-party allegations are incorrect.
If the DPRK fails to convince the Director-General, it must either
permit the inspectors access or demand arbitration from the
Agency Board of Governors.3 2 3 This "entire agreement" inter315. See supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text (reviewing events before
Agency received third-party intelligence).
316. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14(b)-(c).
317. Id. art. 14(b).
318. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (reviewing events before
Agency received third-party intelligence).
319. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 14(b).
320. See supra notes 161-98 and accompanying text (discussing DPRK-Agency negotiations).
321. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 1; see supra note 121 and accompanying text
(discussing North Korean obligation to accept safeguards anywhere in its territory pursuant to NPT).
322. Cf id. art. 14(a) (i)-(ii) (obliging DPRK to make arrangements for alternative
safeguards) with id. art. 18 (allowing Agency to make calls for "essential and urgent"
actions by DPRK).
323. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text (discussing Agency-DPRK dispute resolution mechanisms).
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pretation3

view.

25

24

275

is consistent with the Agency's "total regime"

Article 14 must be read as one small part of a large non-

proliferation regime. 2 6 The nonproliferation regime not only

includes differing sources of treaty law, such as the North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement, the NPT, and the 28IAEA
27
Statute,

but also includes customary international law.3

Unlike the IAEA Statute, the NPT emphasizes that a signatory agrees to allow inspection of all its territories.3 29 However,
the NPT also states that its safeguards are subject to, the 1957
IAEA Statute, 8 ° which seems to require the state's consent to
inspect.83 Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on Treaties
promotes the view that a newer treaty is subject to an older one if
the newer treaty so states.88 2
The IAEA Statute gives more consideration to a signatory's
national sovereignty than does the NPT.331 But the IAEA Statute
comes from a decade where Cold War considerations subsumed
the legal philosophy of collective security. 8 4 The global community shifted emphasis from national sovereignty to collective nuclear security before the Cold War ended. 8 The negotiating
history shows that the parties changed their collective minds as
324. See supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text (reviewing Agency's entire
agreement view).
325. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's entire regime view).
326. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's entire regime view).
327. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing sources of nuclear
nonproliferation regime law).
328. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing sources of nuclear
nonproliferation regime law).
329. NPT, supra note 2, art. III(1), 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
330. Id.
331. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(A) (5), 8 U.S.T. at 11-15, 276 U.N.T.S. at
26-30.
332. Vienna Convention, supra note 306, art. 30(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339-340, 8
I.L.M. at 691.
333. Compare supra note 57 and accompanying text (reviewing IAEA Statute's express provision to function in due observance of member's sovereignty) with supranotes
105-10 and accompanying text (discussing NPT's provision allowing signatories to withdraw to protect its "supreme interests").
334. Bobby Inman et al., Lesons From the Gulf War, 15 WAsH. Q. 57, 64 (1992); see
supra notes 25-86 and accompanying text (reviewing nuclear nonproliferation regime's
negotiating history).
335. See supra notes 25-86 and accompanying text (reviewing nuclear nonproliferation regime's negotiating history).

276

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURIVAL

[Vol. 18:229

world events hastened proliferation."3 6 Agency entry to non-nuclear-weapon signatories was eventuality assumed3 3 7 and even
nuclear weapon states voluntarily submitted to the verification
regime. 3
The conflicting emphasis between the IAEA Statute and the
NPT should be resolved not by choosing one document over the
other, but by reading them as parts of one nonproliferation regime that also includes sources of customary international
law. 339 To construe the entire regime otherwise would contradict the IAEA Statute's own purpose.3 40 Because the NPT and
IAEA Statute are at odds over the sovereignty issue, customary
international law should determine the regime's intent. The
unanimous U.N. General Assembly resolutions during the negotiating process,3 41 as well the current crisis,3 42 illustrate that
3 43
Agency inspections have become customary international law
even when the host nation is resistant to inspections. 4 4 Thus,
any discrepancies between the IAEA Statute and the NPT are
rectified by a review of the negotiating history and customary
international law.3 45
336. Seesupra notes 25-86 and accompanying text (reviewing nuclear nonproliferation regime's negotiating history).
337. Compare, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Baruch Plan's
proposal to only monitor nuclear-capable states) with supra note 46 and accompanying
text (reviewing Agency's purpose of accelerating and enlarging peaceful uses of nuclear
material).
338. Comparesupra note 113 and accompanying text (reviewing NPT safeguard requirements that only apply to non-nuclear-weapon states) with Agreement between the
United States of America and the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, LAEA Doc. GOV/1800, 16 I.L.M. 22 (1976).
339. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (defining customary international
law).
340. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's purposes
under IAEA Statute).
341. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing negotiating history
of NPT and U.N. General Assembly resolutions promulgated during that process); GA.
Res. 48, supra note 193 (urging unanimously that DPRK allow Agency's special inspections despite DPRK notice of intent to withdraw).
342. See GA. Res. 48, supra note 193 (urging unanimously DPRK to allow Agency
special inspections despite DPRK notice of intent to withdraw).
343. See supra note 7 (discussing unanimous U.N. General Assembly resolutions as
source of customary international law).
344. See GA. Res. 48, supra note 193 (urging unanimously DPRK to allow Agency
special inspections despite DPRK notice of intent to withdraw).
345. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (reviewing unanimous U.N.
General Assembly resolutions during negotiation history calling for nuclear nonproliferation); supra note 193 and accompanying text (reviewing unanimous U.N. Gen-
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B. The Agency Duty to Treat Its Members as Equally
Sovereign Nations

Although the Agency breached its safeguards agreement
with North Korea by using third-party intelligence without
Pyongyang's prior agreement, the overarching purposes of the
regime mandate that North Korea address the data's allegation
by permitting the Agency to inspect Nyongbyon. The Agency
has no legal mechanisms that ensures it acts impartially and accurately when reviewing intelligence received from third parties.
Without such regulation, the DPRK point out several persuasive
arguments against Agency use of third-party sources. 4 6 For example, without some regulation of the intelligence-gathering
process, the Agency is demanding that signatories legitimate acts
of espionage committed against them.-47 The lack of regulation
also allows the Agency to innocently or intentionally harass the
intelligence's targets. 348 For example, third-party sources could
easily open up the Agency to manipulation by non-U.S. intelligence agencies.3 4 9 Indeed, this practice could transform the
Agency into an expensive and incompetent international intelligence agency as it tries to weed out information from disinformation. The Agency could also become a tool of international political machinations by having states deliberately withhold or disseminate information according to national
strategies.
The Agency also lacks legal mechanisms that ensure all intelligence that the Agency acquires from third parties will receive equal consideration.3 5 0 The Agency has given no reason
eral Assembly resolution urging DPRK to allow Agency special inspections despite
DPRK notice of intent to withdraw).
346. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (reviewing Agency's use of thirdparty intelligence sources against DPRK).
347. See, e.g., supra note 181 and qccompanying text (reviewing DPRK's assertion
that Agency demands DPRK to legitimate hostile intelligence).
348. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing accusation in DPRK
Withdrawal Statement that Agency is being manipulated by U.S. intelligence).
349. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing accusation in
DPRK Withdrawal Statement that Agency is being manipulated by U.S. intelligence).
350. INFCIRC 403, supra note 6, art. 24; see; e.g., supra note 125 (reviewing requirement in Article 24 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement that all amendments
must be agreed upon); supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing Agency duty
to treat all Member States as equally sovereign states); supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text (discussing lack of existing Agency regulation of third-party intelligence
sources that are agreed upon by DPRK).
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why it chose to react to allegedly American intelligence and yet
failed to address the DPRK's claim that South Korea was creating
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Agency has yet to name officially the source of the third-party data."5 ' While no nation
wants to jeopardize its intelligence operatives, the DPRK deserves an opportunity to confront its accusers, or at least their
data, before allowing Agency entry into Nyongbyon. Allowing a
signatory the opportunity to confront the data before entry is
required is more consistent with the regime's spirit of enforcing
safeguards as unobtrusively as possible. 2
Clearly, the Agency needs to create a legal means of regulating intelligence from third-parties that ensures the Agency acts
impartially when reviewing such intelligence. Member States
like the DPRK are entitled to participate in the existing amendment process and to develop regulations coping with the issues
above. 5 3 An Agency press release, issued unilaterally, does not
provide signatories with their rightful opportunity to participate
in the amendment process.3 5 4 Furthermore, only one month
before North Korea signed its safeguards agreement with the
Agency, the Agency's Board rejected Blix' proposal to receive
data from Member States regarding the nuclear affairs of other
Member States because many Member States opposed Blix' suggestion. 5 5 Such lack of participation is a clear breach of the
North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement's provision stating
351. See supra note 164 (discussing Agency's lack of identification of third-party
source).
352. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. XII(A), 8 U.S.T. at 11-15, 276 U.N.T.S. at 2630; INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 24; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text
(reviewing Agency's duty under IAEA Statute to function in observance of a state's sovereignty); supra note 125 (discussing requirement in Article 24 of North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement that "[a ] 11amendments shall require the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency").
353. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 29; see, e.g., supra note 125 (reviewing North
Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement requirement that all amendments must be
agreed upon); supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text (discussing Agency lack of
existing regulation of third-party intelligence sources that are agreed upon by DPRK).
354. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 24(b); id., art 29; see supra note 125 (reviewing North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement requirement under Article 24(b) that
all amendments must be agreed upon); supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text (discussing Agency lack of existing regulation of third-party intelligence sources that are
agreed upon by DPRK).
355. Blix, Statement to the 35th Session of the General Conference of Atomic Energy, 7-16 (Sept. 16, 1991); see supra note 275 and accompanying text (reviewing Blix'
initial proposal to allow Agency to use third-party sources).
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that all amendments must be agreed upon. 56
Although the question is a close one, the DPRK should
nonetheless address the third-party information. The Agency's
February 1992 press release357 gave the DPRK constructive notice that the Agency would make use of third-party sources and
thus offered North Korea an opportunity to contest the Agency's
decision before implementation."5 ' The DPRK also accepted
the Board's authority to arbitrate emergency disputes when it
signed the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. 59 The
Board's March 18, 199360 resolution rejected the DPRK's assertion that using third-party information conveyed a hostile act3 6 '
by declaring the Director-General's work to be impartial. 62
Most importantly, recent history 63 clearly points to the Agency's
need for better intelligence if it is to carry out its overarching
mission under the entire regime: to safeguard and verify that nuclear weapons are not proliferating among non-nuclear signatory states. 3 64 Finally, even if Nyongbyon undergoes inspection,

requiring the Agency to ignore year-old data would cast aspersions upon any eventual Agency determination. The DPRK
should therefore address the data's allegations.
C. Pyongyang's Self-Defense Claim Is Unpersuasive
Pyongyang's claim that it needs to withdraw from the NPT
365
as an act of self-defense in the face of hostile military exercises
is unpersuasive. The DPRK's claim of self-defense against Team
356. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art 29; see supra note 125 (reviewing requirement
under Article 14 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement that amendments
must be agreed upon by DPRK and Agency).
357. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's announcement to use third-party intelligence sources).
358. IAEA Press Release, IAEA Doc. PR 92/12 (Feb. 26, 1992); INFCIRC/403,
supra note 6, art. 19; see supranotes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's
February 1992 decision to uses third party intelligence sources); supra note 138 (reviewing North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement dispute resolution mechanisms).
359. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 18; see supra notes 138-44 and accompanying
text (discussing Article 18 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
360. IAEA Doc. GOV/2639, supra note 184.
361. DPRK Withdrawal Statement, supra note 20, at 1.
362. IAEA Doc. GOV/2639, supra note 184.
363. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (discussing Agency failure to
detect clandestine nuclear weapons program in NPT signatory Iraq).
364. See, e.g., supra notes 25-147 and accompanying text (discussing regime's negotiating history and primary purpose of ceasing proliferation of nuclear weapons).
365. See supranotes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Team
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Spirit's resumption lacks merit. The NPT drafters clearly envisioned the existence of global military alliances and exercises.3 6 6
The only argument debated then was whether these alliances
could contain nuclear weapons without causing proliferation. 6 7
The debate's relative, but not total, silence on conventional exercises shows the drafters intended such exercises to be permitted. 6 8
Although a more evolved definition of a threat of force
could, in the future, lend credence to the DPRK position, the
North Korean view3 69 is erroneous. The United States and
South Korea conducted these exercises for many years without
370
the threat of a conventional first-strike invasion to Pyongyang.
Team Spirit's resumption is not a threat. Rather, it is a diplomatic warning to the DPRK that shows a lack of trust. Similarly,
the U.S. proposal to re-introduce tactical nuclear weapons to
South Korea is not, in itself, a violation of the NPT.171 The
United States has made explicit threats to North Korea in clear
violation of Article II(4).372 But these threats seemingly have
nothing to do with Team Spirit and Pyongyang has largely ignored them. This silence is further proof of the DPRK's willingSpirit); supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (reviewing DPRK Withdrawal Statement).
366. NPT, supra note 2, art. VII, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
367. See supranote 80 and accompanying text (reviewing NPT's negotiating history
of definition of proliferation); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (reviewing final NPT definition of proliferation); supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing
NPT signatory's right to conclude regional defense agreements).
368. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (reviewing issue of "indirect access"
during negotiating history); supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (reviewing
NPT's collective security provisions).
369. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (discussing North Korean view
that Team Spirit is threat of force against DPRK).
370. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing history of Team
Spirit military exercises).
371. NPT, supra note 2, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171; see supra notes
95-97 and accompanying text (reviewing NPT's definition of proliferation for nuclear
weapons signatories). Nuclear powers are allowed to place nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States as long as that non-nuclear weapon State does not
acquire direct or indirect control of those nuclear weapons. See NPT, supra note 2, art.
I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171; supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (reviewing NPT's definition of proliferation for nuclear weapons signatories).
372. See, e.g., Chronology, supra note 174 (stating that on July 10, 1992, President
Clinton warned that if North Korea uses nuclear bomb, North Korea will cease to exist);
No North Korean Bomb?, WASH. Pos-r, Jan. 6, 1994, at A26 (stating that, on November 7,
1992, President Clinton said "North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear
bomb").
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ness to damage the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime by
putting its political ambitions on the negotiating table.
In addition, Pyongyang's linkage of the Team Spirit military
issue to the nuclear nonproliferation legal conflict is a political
stratagem that does not belong in the realm of international law.
According to public record, the United States and South Korea
never made formal concessions to North Korea in exchange for
the DPRK's ratification of the North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement. In other words, the DPRK's safeguards agreement is
with the Agency and no other entity. Without such formal obligations between the United States and North Korea, the DPRK
when North Korea's
has no right to demand U.S. concessions
73
agreement lies with the Agency.1

Finally, the U.N. foufiding principles of collective security
and rule of law must fill the void left by the Cold War's disappearing political divisions. 3 4 The facts of nuclear nonproliferation make this a particularly appealing case for the rule of international law to assert itself over the realm of international politics. First, nuclear nonproliferation was never within the
3 5
complete control of the superpowers either singly or jointly. ,
Because the superpowers needed the agreement of nonaligned
nations to achieve a global nuclear nonproliferation agreement,3 7 6 the nonproliferation consensus was never just a bipolar

political contest but always a truly global regime. This universality gives the regime legitimacy in both the treaty3 7 7 and the cus-

tomary sources of international law.378
Against the backdrop of these considerations, the Agency's
progressive view of collective security3 79 must prevail over the increasingly archaic notion of indivisible sovereignty for the NPT
373. See generally INFCIRC/403, supra note 6; supra notes 115-47 and accompanying text (reviewing North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).
374. Inman, supra note 334, at 64.
375. See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text (reviewing superpower negotiations thorough history of nonproliferation agreement).
376. See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text (reviewing superpower negotiations throughout history of nonproliferation agreement).
377. E.g., NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
378. See supra note 5 (defining customary law); supra note 7 and accompanying
text (discussing regime's composition of customary international law); supra notes 25114 and accompanying text (reviewing history of nonproliferation agreement negotiations, including unanimous U.N. General Assembly resolutions).
379. See supra notes 283-93 and accompanying text (discussing Agency's understanding of collective security and threat of force).
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to have any real meaning. If the DPRK's view of sovereignty3 8 ° is
sustained, any nation can pull out of the Treaty without consequence. The progressive view, however, treats sovereignty as
"sticks" and encourages an international legal system that promotes global collective security to evolve.
Using the same analysis, however, the DPRK does not have
to give the Agency complete access to Nyongbyon. Applying Director-General Blix' sticks of sovereignty analysis3 8 ' here reveals
that the DPRK has not handed over all of its "sticks." The IAEA
Statute guarantees that all Agency functions shall be with a view
to national sovereignty."8 2 The NPT also mentions state sovereignty and supreme interests in its withdrawal clause. 83 In light
of these textual provisions and Blix' own theory, Article 14
should be read to give the material accountancy "stick" to the
IAEA. In this light, the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement states that the DPRK agreed that if it could not meet its
burden of proof to make it clear no proscribed activities would
occur in military facilities then the Agency could conduct material accountancy tests on those sites. Because military facilities
are of vital interest, the Agency should forgo other "sticks" that
are secondary safeguards, like surveillance and containment, as
too intrusive in this sensitive area unless verification cannot be
achieved without them. 8 4 The Agency would bear the burden
of proof in arbitration that any other "sticks" are so necessary
that taking them away would constitute a violation of the IAEA
Statute. Furthermore, this solution respects the IAEA Statute's
requirement that all Agency activities be carried out in due observance of state sovereignty.3 85
380. See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text (discussing DPRK definition of
sovereignty under nonproliferation regime).
381. See supranotes 294-301 and accompanying text (discussing Blix' view of sovereignty).
382. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8; see
supra note 57 (reiterating text of Article III(D) of IAEA Statute).
383. NPT, supra note 2, art. X(1), 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173; see supra
note 87 and accompanying text (reviewing NPT withdrawal clause's text).
384. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 29; see supra notes 123-24 and accompanying
text (reviewing prioritization of safeguards under North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement).
385. IAEA Statute, supra note 2, art. III(D), 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8; see
supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (reviewing IAEA Statute requirement that
Agency functions be carried out in due observance of signatory sovereignty).
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D. Sovereignty and the Withdrawal Clause

The NPT's withdrawal clause reflects Director-General Blix'
progressive view of sovereignty 8 6 because it allows North Korea
to retain its "supreme interests" while taking the DPRK's right to
deny Agency inspections during the three-month notice period. 8 7 The clause also envisions the nonproliferation regime
set within a system of international laws."" Furthermore, Pyongyang's argument that it can withdraw from the NPT because 3of
89
its lack of formal diplomatic relations with the United States
in unfounded. The DPRK's agreement is with the Agency, not
the United States. The official status of U.S.-DPRK relations has
no legal repercussions upon an agreement between the Agency
and the DPRK- 9 ° The DPRK's attempt to link its diplomatic status vis-d-vis the United States"9 ' to other NPT legal issues is, like
Pyongyang's attempt to link Team Spirit to the legal debate, an
attempt to replace international law with international political
interests. Moreover, the Agency recognizes the DPRK as a
state.3 92 Furthermore, customary international law regards the
DPRK as a state 393 and thus places the customary responsibility
of States to uphold its treaty obligations upon North Korea.
Similarly, Pyongyang's belief that withdrawal is instantly effective3 9 4 is clearly not supported by the NPT's text. The NPT
withdrawal clause clearly calls for a three-month period where
the signatory is still a party to the Treaty.3 95 This fits with the
commonly accepted legal definition of the word "notice," where
386. See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text (discussing Blix' view of sovereignty).
387. NPT, supra note 2, art X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
388. See, e.g., NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
389. See supra note 20 (discussing recent history of North Korean relations with
United Nations and United States); supra note 181 (reviewing DPRK Withdrawal Statement's declaration that United States is "belligerent party vis-a-vis DPRK").
390. See supra notes 160-98 and accompanying text (reviewing DPRK negotiations
with Agency regarding access to Nyongbyon).
391. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (reviewing DPRK claims that "specific conditions" vis-a-vis U.S. lack of recognition of DPRK statehood allows North Korea
to withdraw from NPT and block special inspections).
392. See, e.g., 1993 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 19, supra note 7.
393. See RESTATEMENT (T-RnD) OF FOREIGN LAw § 201, cmt. h (1986).
394. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing DPRK view that
notice of intent to withdraw thus gives DPRK instant right to deny Agency special inspection).
395. NPT, supra note 2, art. X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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the party giving notice continues to have fights and obligations
until the notice period tolls. To interpret the provision otherwise would make the words "three months notice" meaningless.
CONCLUSION
To maintain the NPT's force of law, the United Nations
must strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime by reinforcing the regime's weakest point: the Agency's power to verify
NPT compliance. The current crisis shows several areas of weakness in the Agency's ability to perform safeguards that need fortification. First, the Agency must have better access to and regulation of intelligence sources to achieve the verification and deterrence purposes of safeguards.39 6 Second and more important,
the 1995 conference must clarify the limitations that safeguards
agreements promulgated under the NPT impose on the national
sovereignty of its members for the sake of global collective security. 39 ' For example, language such.as the North Korean-Agency
Safeguards Agreement's Article 14 provision on military applications3 98 should be strengthened from permitting the Agency "to
call upon" 39 9 the signatory to take action immediately to stating

that the signatory "agrees to" undertake the immediate action
without the ability to appeal. Stronger agreement language,
quicker enforcement processes, and better regulation of intelligence sources will allow the nuclear nonproliferation regime to
function more effectively and with fewer legal conflicts in future
confrontations.

396. See supra notes 151-65 (reviewing Agency's need for better intelligence, as
demonstrated by Iraq and DPRK case histories).
397. NPT, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 484-86, 729 U.N.T.S. at 162-63. The
Treaty's preamble explicitly states that the NPT was created to promote international
peace and security in accordance with the U.N. Charter's requirement that states refrain from threat or use of force. Id.
398. INFCIRC/403, supra note 6, art. 18; see supranotes 138-44 and accompanying
text (discussing requirements under Article 18 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards
Agreement).
399. See supra note 139 (reiterating text of Article 18 of North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement).

